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 INTRODUCTION
Rodney N. Purvis Q.C.
For the conspirators there had necessarily to be a conjunction of factors
before they could participate in the violations. First, of course, they had
to perceive that there would be gains accruing from their behaviour. Such
gains might be personal and professional in terms of corporate advancement
towards prestige and power; they might be vocational in terms of a more
expedient and secure method of carrying out assigned tasks. The offenders
also apparently had to be able to neutralise or rationalise their behaviour
in a manner in keeping with their image of themselves as law-abiding, decent
and respectable persons . . .
(Geis, White Collar Crime, page'll6).
When a Criminologist speaks of crime, he is seldom thinking of any act
which affects him so directly as, for example, a blow to the head. More likely
he is thinking of the immense costs to a community of white collar crime, of
occupational offences generally, of organised vice and of business racketeering.
IdentifiCation of criminality, whereby activities the like of those just
mentioned are clearly indicated to society at large as criminal, is necessary and
too long delayed. The importance of knowledge of familiarising a community
as to the “standards of commercial, moral behaviour” which will, and which
will not be the subject of criminal sanctions, is essential if respect for and
compliance with the law is to be achieved.
The environment in which a person carries out his daily endeavours can
well be conducive to acts not being regarded by the individual as criminal, or
even wrong, in a professional, commercial or financial sense. The individual may
well regard such conduct as being in the ordinary course of his profession or
business, and no more than a “common sense” professional activity.
Human deviance is closely associated with social problems and social
control. In the absence of self-imposed control, control imposed by one’s peers,
or control imposed by legislation, an individual must look to his own tenets before
committing any particular act. It may be more difficult in the latter case than
in any one of the former. That is, where a person has to make his own assessment
of commercial morality without guidelines provided by his peers, the choice may
well be more difficult. If guidelines are provided by some other person, then it
will be easier for the individual to say that the parameters have been set by such
guidelines—anything within such parameters is permissible. If he himself has to
make up his mind, then the limits may be more extensive than those that would
be defined by his professional organisation or legislation.
Peer group support for occupational and commercial deviance invariably
widens the field of misbehaviour.
For some time past, the Institute of Criminology of the University of Sydney,
through its Advisory Committee, has been minded to conduct a number of
Seminars on the subject of White Collar Crime. The decision to hold a Seminar
. . A
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on Crime and the Professions was as a consequence of the Institute having held
the earlier Seminars, there considering legal principles applicable to the particular
kind of criminality, the procedures appropriate for investigation and prosecution
of white collar crime, the role of the Corporate Affairs Commission in this regard,
and whether the procedure presenlty followed in our Courts is adequate to the task.
The cause of white collar crime had, to a limited extent, been considered.
In order to obtain a more complete appreciation of the nature of the acts
being committed and, if possible, some understanding of the forces that were
leading otherwise morally conscious persons to perpetrate acts of criminality
committed against their fellow professionals, as well as the community, the
Committee turned its attention to those sections of the community in which
difficulty is being felt in overseeing the conduct of members and disciplining
deviance. The matters of immediate concern were seen to be the apparent increase
in the incidence of this type of white collar crime, and why, accepting that there
had been an increase, such acts take place.
The professions of particular moment in this regard are the accounting
profession, the legal profession, and the medical profession. Each of the pro-
fessions by their executive members enthusiastically supported the proposal, and
so this Seminar.
The persons asked to present papers, whilst all very experienced in the
conduct of the medical profession, were known to hold views somewhat diverse
from one another. It was thought that the interplay could result in valuable
information being brought forth.
If there has been an increase in the incidence of breaches of professional
morality and conduct of a criminal nature in the professions, then'why has this
taken place in our society as it is to-day? Why has it, if it be so, taken place
amongst those who otherwise are well endowed with intellectual capacity and a
measurable degree of financial security?
These were the questions that demanded to be'answered at the Seminar.
 THE PRACTITIONER: CRIME AND/OR ETHICS,
THE MORALITY OF OVERPROVISION OF MEDICAL SERVICES.
Dr Noe! Van Dugteren,
Medical Secretary,
N.S.W. Branch of the
Australian Medical Association
The medical profession in New South Wales is controlled by many Acts
of Parliament, both at Commonwealth and State levels. Examples in the Federal
sphere are the Health Insurance Act, the National Health Act, the Commonwealth
Workers Compensation Act and the Trade Practices Act; while at State level there
are the Medical Practitioners’ Act, the Workers Compensation Act, the Consumer
Claims Tribunal Act, the Public Hospitals Act, the Poisons Act, the Crimes Act,
the Child Welfare Act, the Industrial Arbitration Act, the Arbitration Act, the
Ambulance Transport Act, the Birth Deaths and Marriages Act, the Coroner’s
Act, the Venereal Diseases Act, the Mental Health Act, the Inebriates Act, the
Coalmining Regulations Act, the Partnership Act, the Supreme Court Witnesses
Act, the Minors (Property and Contract) Act, and the Anti Discrimination Act.
Additionally, medical practitioners must be aware of Case Law or the Law of
Precedent, and the Defamation Act when considering confidentiality.
The introduction of the Health Insurance Act, commonly known at the time
as “Medibank” introduced a system of funding medical services which, while
not entirely new, was an open-ended invitation to over-utilisation and fraud to
both the community and the medical profession. Previous experience with the
Pensioner Medical Service under the National Health Act gave very solid evidence
that where the patient was not financially involved in the fee for a service, demand
was high and abuse occurred. The Australian Medical Association’s advice was
not heeded and the media has given full publicity to the end result.
It is essential that breaches of the Health Insurance Act are categorised.
In the main, there are over-utilisation which is covered by Divisions 3, 4 and 5
of the Act and fraud which is dealt with under s. 129. Another possible abuse
causing concern to the Commonwealth Department of Health is known as
“polyitemisation”.
The major difference between over-utilisation and fraud is that over-
utilisation is the supply of services that may be seen to be not clinically necessary
while fraud is rendering an account for a service that has not been supplied.
“Polyitemisation” means listing in an account, every possible service that may
have been provided during an episode.
A judgement on ovenutilisation based on clinical need, is dealt with by
Medical Services Committees of Inquiry with appropriate systems of appeal.
Medical Services Committees of Inquiry are composed of five members. One is
the Commonwealth Director of Health for the State or his representative and
the other four are appointed by the Minister for Health from a panel nominated
by the Australian Medical Association. Of the four, two are general practitioners,
one a procedural doctor, such as a surgeon and the other a non-procedural doctor
such as a physician or psychiatrist.
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In brief, the computer printout indicates those doctors whose profiles show
a higher utilisation rate than those of their colleagues in similar disciplines and
circumstances. If a profile shows a questionable pattern of servicing in the view
of the Commonwealth Department of Health the doctor concerned is counselled
by a medical practitioner employed for that purpose by the Department. Normally
there is discussion between the counsellor and the doctor under review about his
pattern of servicing and relevant matters relating to his practice. If indicated,
the doctor’s profile is reviewed some six months after the interview and then may
possibly be referred to a Committee of Inquiry.
The Committee of Inquiry examines the doctor’s pattern of service and
decides whether an inquiry is indicated and, if so, seeks clinical notes. The
Committee may subsequently request the presence of the doctor at one of its
meetings. On the basis of the clinical evidence available to it, the Committee then
determines on the need for each item of service under review and makes
appropriate recommendation to the Minister. The Minister, on the basis of the
recommendation, determines whether any action shall be taken and, if so, whether
there should be a reprimand, the retrieval of monies paid or the non payment
of fees billed.
At appeals against the Minister’s determination, many problems have been
met due to legal interpretation by the judiciary of the Committee’s procedures
and the Commonwealth is still concerned as to how they can best function.
Currently it is necessary for the Committees in N.S.W. to examine every item
of service supplied and billed and they cannot utilise a sampling technique to
establish a pattern on which to base their recommendations to the Minister.
Fraud is mainly covered by s. 129 of the Act which states;
129 (1) A person shall not make a statement, either orally or in writing,
or issue or present a document, that is false or misleading in a
material particular and is capable of being used, in connection with
or in support of, an application for approval for the purposes of
this Act for payment of an amount under this Act.
Penalty $10,000 or imprisonment for five years.
129 (2) A person shall not furnish in pursuance of this Act or the
regulations a return of information that is false or misleading in
a material particular.
Penalty $10,000 or imprisonment for five years.
The essential factor in fraud is that a bill is issued which can gain a medical
rebate for the patient, or through assignment for the doctor, for a service which
was not supplied. An example of actions for fraud against doctors by the
Commonwealth police recently has been alleged billing by doctors for services
of a longer duration than actually supplied. The allegations known as the “Greek
Conspiracy” involve charges that to a large extent fall outside the Health Insurance
Act. In the main they involve the Department of Social Security.
How “polyitemisation” can be dealt with is difﬁcult to assess but it is alleged
that some doctors show a pattern indicating that when they perform a certain
procedure they invariably add other procedures to it. Additionally their profile
of service is quite distinct from that of their colleagues in the same discipline.
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It is impossible to determine whether in fact the additional services were supplied,
or, if they were supplied, whether they were clinically indicated. Decisions would
require specialised knowledge and an elaborate record keeping system. The degree
of this form of abuse, if in fact it does exist, is problematical and the establishment
of a system of investigation and control might not merit the end result. I have
no knowledge of the percentage of the profession that has consciously or
unconsciously accepted the blandishments of Medibank.
It must be understood that medical practitioners are registered in N.S.W.
though they have not had instruction in their obligations under the law. Universities
claim that within the five year training programme there is little available time
for sessions on such matters. Once graduated, it is difficult to arrange for formal
education as interns are scattered throughout the State hospitals system and have
duty rosters to fulfil. It seems wrong to train doctors to the standard of clinical
excellence that is sought by the community while leaving them ignorant of the
laws introduced by politicians for the funding of medical services. Similarly it
is quite wrong to allow the registration of overseas graduates and give them work
permits when they are unfamiliar with the system of supply of medical services
in this country. This was recently demonstrated when English graduates were found
guilty of fraud.
There are many reasons for over utilisation and fraud some of which are
due to ignorance, some to clinical expediency and the circumstances of the
moment, and some to defensive medicine. It' is accepted that, as in any occupation,
there are a few rogues and strong measures need to be taken to remove them from
the medical profession for both the sake of the profession and the community.
However, the community through the Government needs to see how the
others, i.e. the ignorant and the foolish, may be educated and persuaded. At times
it would appear that some politicians would prefer to have the profession make
enough rope to hang itself and are reluctant for that reason to take firm action
that would act as a deterrent to the ill advised. It is obvious from inquiries received
at the A.M.A. from patients and members of the profession that there is a degree
of fraud at a comparatively minor level that is due to ignorance on the part of
the doctor supplying the service.
In the Health Insurance Act professional attention is defined as meaning,
amongst other things, a medical or surgical treatment by or under the supervision
of a medical practitioner. The Commonwealth Department of Health holds the
following attitude in respect of professional attention.
1. A medical benefit rebate only appertains for services listed under Part
‘ l (attendances) in the medical benefits scheduled when there has been a
physical contact with the patient and only for the period of time when the
medical practitioner is in personal attendance upon the patient.
2. For all procedures listed in the schedule book a rebate appertains when
a procedure is fulfilled by a person who is under the supervision of the
medical practitioner billing for the service. For some procedures the
supervision can be somewhat distant as long as the person acting on behalf
of the doctor is an employee or agent. However the wording of some items
impose a finer meaning to the extent that the doctor (with particular
recognition) must be present. .
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.From that attitude it may be assessed that the Commonwealth Department of
Health would consider an account fraudulent for a prolonged consultation on
the basis of time spent by a physiotherapist giving a patient physiotherapy when
the general practitioner himself was occupied elsewhere.
Additionally this has particular relevance when a doctor supplies a certificate
or repeat prescription at the request of a patient by telephone and the doctor does
not have any form of attendance on the patient during the supply of the service
for which the account is rendered. This does not imply that the fee may not be
merited but the rebate is not available. The important point is that any account
or receipt issued should not be in a form that could lead a fund into incorrectly
paying a benefit for an attendance which has not taken place.
Insofar as over-utilisation is concerned there are factors that are difficult
to control. We live in an advanced and highly educated society. The expectation
of patients now are that they shall have a high quality of living and many make
demands of their medical attendants with that view. Many services are supplied
on patient request to overcome symptoms and fears that in other circumstances
might well be tolerated.
The continual intrusion of the Department of Consumer Affairs into the
disciplining of professions and the loud voice of consumer organisations must
inevitably force the medical profession into “defensive medicine”. Diagnostic
services and consultative services may well be used, not as a clinical need, but
as a defence against future possible litigation or investigation. If consumerism
continues as it is going medical services must become more expensive.
One of the anachronisms of over-utilisation is the busy doctor. A doctor
.with a packed waiting room and behind in his appointments may tend to hurry
patients through. Because of that hurry he is concerned he might have missed
something of importance in the patient’s clinical picture. He brings the patient
back in the hope that next time he will have the opportunity for a more thorough
examination and consultation. He may order additional investigations to ensure
that something is being done but the end result is that the patient is brought back
again and again and his waiting room remains just as crowded if not even more
crowded. That is a chain reaction of over-utilisation which at times can be
extremely difficult to break.
It must not be forgotten that when the word over-utilisation is used it does
not necessarily mean that the additional services are for the financial benefit of
the medical practitioner ordering them. A medical practitioner who refers a patient
to a consultant or orders diagnostic tests is himself making no personal profit
out of those things he has requested. If he were to seek some profit he could well
place himself in danger of deregistration under the Medical Practitioners Act while
the Health Insurance Act is most firm concerning kick-backs of any kind to
referring doctors in the field of pathology.
The New South Wales Branch of the Australian Medical Association has
submitted to the Minster for Health that there should be an Act to control lay
organisations and companies entering into the field of medicine in a similar manner
as medical practitiones are controlled under the Medical Practitioners Act.
J—
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The entry of lay organisations, companies, commercialism and entrepreneurs
into the field of supply of medical services is raising many problems within the
master-servant relationship as to where responsibility lies for the service supplied.
While a medical practitioner supplies the medical service that attains a medical
benefit he may well be acting under the instructions of an employing authority
who is not answerable under the Medical Practitioners Act or the Health Insurance
Act. This is another area causing concern to the Commonwealth Department of ',
Health and the organised profession. ‘
The Australian Medical Association has had many consultations with the
Commonwealth Department of Health as to how breaches of the Health Insurance
Act may best be controlled and minimised. Proposals that appear to be eminently
reasonable are seen as legally difficult to implement by the Attorney-Generals’
Departmmt. Essentially however, it would appear that the only true answer is
for universities to ensure that their graduates are not only versed in matters of
a clinical nature but are also adequately taught their ethical and legal obligations
to their patients, the community and their colleagues.
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr. N. Van Dugteren
The point that I would like particularly to speak to from my paper concerns
the people who judge their colleagues when looking at over-utilisation. One of
the biggest areas of criticism that the profession as a whole receives is that it is
not prepared to act (or can’t or won’t) in a peer review situation, and that the
A.M.A. won’t do anything about its membership. We want to know why we
should do anything about our membership other than look at the clinical services
they supply in a manner that is reasonable. That is being implemented in many
ways. The medical profession has been frightened of the word “peer” review for
a long time—quite understandably when we look at overseas precedents.
The papers presented at this Seminar show, on the one hand, that the
A.M.A. is accused of living in the pocket of government in its cooperation with
Committees of Inquiry and, on the other hand, of being unduly under the inﬂu-
ence of the profession and not being prepared to take any action.
There is a big difference between fraud and over-utilisation. Both may well
be in ignorance and in fact—s. 129 of the Health Insurance Act which refers to
fraud gives ignorance as a legitimate plea as a defence.
The Association goes to considerable trouble when it is proposing a series
of names to the Commonwealth Minister of Health from whom he will choose
those who will sit in judgment on their colleagues. These people are selected not
just for their clinical knowledge, which is important because they must be
practising clinicians, but they must be people who are actively involved in seeing
patients and have some knowledge of what clinical practice is all about. They
must be people whom we think will not be prejudiced one way or other but will
look clearly at the issues involved and the clinical services supplied.
There are avenues of appeal against their decisions. All the Committee of
Inquiry does is to recommend to the Minister that all is well, that the clinical
services supplied were necessary, or that certain services were not indicated on
a clinical basis and it is up to the Minister to determine what he will then do.
There is a system of appeal by a doctor who is unhappy about the determination
by the Minister. There is no system of appeal by the Committee of Inquiry about
what the Minister does on their recommendation and, in fact, it has been known
where a Minister on a political basis has rejected what a committee has
recommended.
In my paper one of the problems I referred to is “do governments really
wish to see the rogues within the profession properly suppressed?”. We are talking
about matters of a political nature, and I must apologise if I sound political in
this particular context, but a striking example is that one week before an election
campaign in New South Wales the Minister for Health attacked doctors who are
supplying services at Nowra on a “fee for service” basis. He put forward figures
that need to be validated, and on experience I do not give them all the credibility
that you would anticipate. We have known about what is happening in Nowra
for 18 months or longer and, in fact, the local doctors, who were not wealthy
North Shore doctors but happened to be Registrars mainly from St Vincents and
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Prince Alfred Hospitals had contacted me some time ago asking my advice as
to how they could manage the problem that was happening there. I hoped that
it had been quietly settled, but one week before an election campaign it is raked
up and thrown against the medical profession as a whole. In'my view, it is
frequently the position where a government, who needs something to deﬂect the
public’s view of their own shortcomings whether it be in the health area or any
other, would prefer to have a tame set of rogues available to utilise in a political
manner. Whether they are rogues or not does not matter as long as they can be
made to appear rogues.
The medical profession has a difficult row to hoe. It has difficulty in gaining
the respect of the community because of rather harsh treatment by the media.
It has difficulty in gaining the cooperation of government when it endeavours
to institute quality assurance programmes to ensure that the profession is fully
educated, clinically, legally, and ethically, and will continue in that position
for ever.
 THE AETIOLQGY OF MEDIBANK FRAUD
Dr Denis P. Mackey,
Past President,
The General Practitioners’
Society in Australia
. . . the State . . . has converted the practice of Medicine front a noble
and honourable profession into an ignoble and dishonourab/e one.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
What makes a doyen of the medical profession yesterday, a petty criminal
today? Why is it that in New South Wales alone, according to the Commonwealth
Health Department, one doctor per week is arrested for allegedly defrauding the
National Health Scheme? The Commonwealth Health Department has stated that
every week 4 to 5 doctors in New South Wales could be successfully prosecuted
for Medi Fraud. What has changed the once noble profession into a bunch of
crooks?
The government has recently legislated that the Profession’s Own Star
Chamber, the “Medical Services Committee of Inquiry” is to have more power;
power to demand that a doctor come before this “Kangaroo Court” or pay a
fine of $10,000; and power to demand that the doctor’s medical records be
presented to this body. The Medical Services committee of Inquiry is a group
set up by the Australian Medical Assocation in accordance with s. 79 of the Health
Insurance Act to investigate overservicing by doctors.
Overservicing is not defined, but is determined by a computer print-out of
medical services that deviate from the norm. If the doctor does more of a particular
kind of medical service than the area average, he could be regarded as an
overservicer and he and his patientsinvestigated. If a doctor does more home
visits on his pensioner patients than the area average or counsels more of his
underprivileged patients than the area average, then that doctor and his patients
will be visited by officials from the Commonwealth Health Department. If the
doctor’s computer profile is in any way irregular by comparison with his
colleagues, he is open to prosecution. If the doctor does not conform to that
marxist doctrine of equality, action can be taken against him.
I am not here to defend any doctor found guilty of fraud as defined i.e.,
“using false representations to gain unjust advantages” but to point out that there
is a vast difference between the undefined overservicing, and Medi Fraud. Recently
in a Morgan Gallup‘, doctors topped the ratings for ethics and honesty. Federal
Politicians scored badly on both issues, and rated just above used car salesmen
and union leaders. I don’t know about union leaders, but I personally reckon
this is a slight to the used car dealer.
The present medical scheme is analogous to a situation where the Police
Department build a long wide flat stretch of road, then restrict the speed limit
to 50 km/h and set speed traps along the road daily. Practically every motorist
1. Public Opinion Poll, Bulletin, June 9th, 1981.
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would be found guilty of speeding. The open—ended medical scheme with undefined
parameters is in itself a fraudulent system that requires reform. It is fraudulent
in that it falsely claims to offer a high quality medical care to all irrespective of
the patients ability to pay. The government simply cannot guarantee quality and
probably has no role to play in private medical practice.
Recent media releases by the Federal Health Department2 as quoted in the
press could have the public believe that widespread medical fraud exists throughout
the profession. A bureaucrat, with no partiuclar expertise in any field of medicine,
has played around with his toy computer and made some preposterous conclu-
sions indicting the medical profession. He is quoted in the Melbourne Age as saying
“The Federal Health Department believes doctors services could be costing the
government and health funds $100 million a year more than necessary”. “The
payouts” he said “are because of fraud and doctors providing more services than
necessary”. A smear campaign against the medical profession has been instigated
by the bureaucrats—one wonders why? As the smoke screen spreads a bit, the
Minister for Health, Mr MacKellar, is quoted by the same source: “Since 1975,
more than 30 doctors had been prosecuted for making false claims for Federal
medical benefits, and more than 1 million dollars had been recovered”. 3 A far
cry from the bureaucrat’ s claim.
The bureaucrats have set up a “Schedule of Fees” showing the rebates a
patient can obtain from registered insurance funds.vThe schedule has nothing to
do with doctors fees, but has a lot to do with the amount of money a patient
can receive as a rebate, provided the doctor itemizes his receipt with the appropriate
number. The “Schedule of Fees” has in itself become a racket.
Item 3 is a short consultation, i.e., less than 5 minutes, and attracts a rebate
of $8.10. ~
Item 14 is,a consultation (which is regarded as a routine G.P. consultation) between
5 to 25 minutes and attracts a rebate of $11.20.
Item 25 is a consultation longer than 25 minutes but less than 45 minutes and
attracts a rebate of $21.
The difference between 24 minutes 59 seconds and 25 minutes i.e., that 1 second,
is worth $9.80 and if the rebate in any way affects the fee charged by the doctor
then this 1 second becomes very significant and the scene is set for baiting the
trap for the medical profession.
In an article written for The Australian G.P.,4 Dr Gary North, an economist
from the U.S.A., wrote about a 4. point strategy used by bureaucrats in an attempt
to socialize the practice of medicine. The 4 part strategy consists of:
l. Baiting the trap
2. Setting the trap
3. Springing the trap
4. Skinning the victims.
Baiting the Trap
The government sets up a medical scheme promising to help all thosein
need provided the doctors co--o.perate The short term benefits of government
 
2. Melbourne Age, 18th June, 1981.
3. Melbourne Age, 16th June, 1981.
4. The Australian G.P., April 1978 “A Trap for Professionals”.
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subsidy to the medical profession as with the Medibank scheme are usually too
great for the organized medical profession to resist. Organized medicine as
represented (incorrectly) by the A.M.A. steps in and concludes (incorrectly) that
government support will permit them to serve the public body better, while making
them a tidy profit to boot. The A.M.A. as a “trade union” representing its
members cannot resist the offer of subsidies. Medibank Mark I (1975 edition)
' promised the doctor a secure income backed by the Treasury. The doctor would
have no longer to worry about bad debts as the g0vernment would guarantee the
fee, provided the doctor stuck to the scheduled fee. The doctor would no longer
have to dispense charity as the government would guarantee payment of bills by
pensioners and the disadvantaged. This bonanza to the medical profession was
safe so long as “official spokesmen” for the profession continued to have
“meaningful dialogue” with the bureaucrats, and co-operate by sitting on
committees of inquiry and thus gaining status by their participation. The
profession gets used to having these distinguished members speak out in the name
of the profession, but these distinguished gentlemen are simultaneously speaking
out for the government, for it is now the government which enforces standards.
Setting the Trap
The Health Department, after establishing this scheme must by law account
for every dollar spent. It has to be sure that no one is receiving any money or
benefits who is not conforming to basic government standards. The government
must always uphold the public interest. That is the theory of democratic
government. The reality is simpler, the politicians create a system of bureaucratic
control over the whole economy once the subsidy system becomes widespread.
The official purpose of any expenditure is “the public interest”. The real purpose
is the expansion of political power. He who fails to grasp this point will miss
the meaning of the twentieth century.
The government having thus granted a monopoly by way of subsidies to
the medical profession now prepares for controls. The government now warns
about possible abuses of this monopoly position. The government with help of
the “official spokesmen” of the medical profession now sets up guidelines so
as to reduce the likelihood of such abuses. In spite of the bedroom cooperation
of the A.M.A., the government finds abuses anyway. So we conclude that the
primary purpose of the monopoly to grant power, from the government’s point
of view, is to create opportunities for abuses. The system is established so that
someone will milk it.
The government finds doctors more easy to control through the “official
spokesmen”, and therefore appeals to the profession’s sense of fair play. The
“official spokesmen” agree with the bureaucrats that professional standards
' should be established and a “peer” review committee is envisaged to enforce these
standards.
Costs rise inevitably as expenditures rise and the “Schedule fee” remains
stationary. However, the “official spokesmen” (incorrectly) participate in the
government inquiry into ‘medical fees’ which is a misnomer because the inquiry
deals only with patient rebates and has nothing to do with medical fees. The
“official spokesmen” from the A.M.A. hope that by increasing patient rebates
they havedone something towards increasing medical fees. The A.M.A. has
J_,
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continued to partake in the Ludeke Tribunals, and now the lsaacs Tribunal,
without realizing that it is helping to set the trap. Sooner or later the government
will advise “the Tribunal” that there is to be no increase in the “Schedule fee”
and in spite of protests from the “official spokesmen”, the trap is set.
Springing the Trap
Eventually the government or news media will discover someone who is
milking the eminently milkable system of government subsidies. Someone is
ripping off the public. Someone is making too much money. Someone is being
greedy. The public’s interest is being threatened. Something has to be done.
No one is actually breaking any law, you understand. The open—ended system
allows for exploitation. Twenty-five minute consultations will proliferate in the
practice of a not too busy doctor—after all he is not breaking the law. Nevertheless,
the politicians smell blood and votes. The news media smell blood and headlines.
The stories continue. Reports of ﬂagrant violation of standards, meaning
abnormally high incomes for a few doctors, continue to be featured in the media.
The A.M.A. is told to police its ranks, but this is impossible, since no laws are
being broken. So the stories continue. Of course, they continue. Why do you think
the system was created in the first place? To create scandal. Scandal is ideal for
the expansion of government power. Even if the scandal is manufactured. Even
if the scandal is not really illegal. In fact, especially if the scandal is really legal.
A legal scandal if based on profit can safely be expected to continue. The profit
motive will do its work. What is that work? To create a crisis that demands further
government intervention.
Eventually the hierarchy of the medical profession is alarmed. The stories
of scandal keep coming. The “official spokesmen” are impotent to do anything.
They know that only a few doctors are involved in the scandal and are ready to
allow the government to step in temporarily and clean up the mess so that the
honest men can practise in peace. They miss the whole point. The government’s
goal is to control and reshape the practices of the honest men. The government
does not care a hoot about the scandals. Thescandals are the excuse for inter-
vention, not the cause.
Conferences are called. Control boards are established. The government, '
in cooperation with the “official spokesmen”_ from the A.M.A. delegate the
medical services committees of inquiry more power in an attempt to halt the
abuses. Amazingly, the abuses increase. There are more headlines. The closer
the government and reporters look into the scandals the more there are. The
“partnership” between the government and the “official spokesmen” of the
A.M.A. is not working. The medical profession is not cooperating. Stronger
medicine (to coin a phrase) is needed—government medicine. The trap is now
sprung. The bureaucrats from the Commonwealth Health Department take over.
Skinning the Victim
Huge amounts of government money are spent policing the profession. The
Commonwealth Health Department expands its bureaucracy with “computer
experts” and details counsellors to advise the profession on the spirit of the
National Health Scheme. Paper work proliferates to vindicate the expansion of
, the health bureaucracy. Doctors are now compelled to send forms to Canberra
to authorise certain prescriptions. Government referral vouchers are required if
 ‘22
patients are to receive higher rebates for specialist attention. Referral patterns
are investigated by the “computer experts” to see if G.Pt. Dr X is referring “too
many” patients to gynaecologist Dr Y for hysterectomies, which they regards as
unnecessary. Commonwealth police are called in to investigate overservicing which
is designated as fraud.
The OP. who visits the old age home every week to seehis patients is
regarded as doing a “milk run”. The old folk should not be seen so often. Peer
review standards of visiting homes suggests that these people need to be seen only
every month. The young doctor setting up practice and spending greater than
25 minutes on his patients is regarded as an overservicer by comparison with the
established G.P. down the road-ethis practice must stop. Counselling the socially
disadvantaged with prolonged consultations is regarded by the Commonwealth
Health Department as unnecessary, yet this department encouraged this style of
medical practice as a form of preventive medicine, and set up bulk billing processes
to attract doctors to this scheme.
' The sports conscious doctor who regards respiratory function tests as an
integral part of his medical consultation is also the target for officers from the
Commonwealth Health Department because the average doctor doesn’t bother
with such tests. With continued “muck raking” the whole medical profession
becomes a scandal. At this point the government ceases to discover any new
scandals. It cannot afford to do so, since the government now operates the delivery
system. Besides, standards are so low by now that the investigators have trouble
in locating visible scandals that stand out from the general practice.
I hope never to witness this final bureaucratization of medicine where the
whole profession is regarded as crooked with a public rating equal to that of
politicians. But I do understand why certain inadequate doctors abuse the system
by accepting government money in a bulk-billing situation. Any doctor who bulk
bills must be regarded as a potential criminal.
If the Commonwealth Health Department wished to cut down abuses (but
I am sure it has a vested interest in making sure abuses do occur—jobs are at
stake) it would strive to abolish bulk billing and assignment of benefits. Computer
print outs show that 85% “overservicing” occurs in this area. It is amazing to
find that the top bureaucrats have campaigned their politicians and ministers to
maintain bulk billing in spite of the obvious abuses, and in spite of the findings
of the Razor Gang.
In researching the “Aetiology of Medibank Fraud”, the medical bureaucracy
come under close scrutiny. Why did the Commonwealth Health Department
allegedly overpay the chemists $235 million over the past 5 years? Was this criminal
negligence or incompetence from the Commonwealth Health Department—or was
it blatant fraud? Is someone covering up for a top bureaucrat caught with his
hand in the till. The advent of computers and the increase of white collar crime5
with programmed embezzling would suggest that in looking at “Crime in the
Professions” we may be looking in the wrong direction.
If I were a detective investigating Medibank fraud and l was told that $235
 
5. Report from head of the Australian Computer Abuse Research Bureau, Mr Kevin Fitzgerald.
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million was allegedly overpaid to chemists by the Commonwealth Health .
Department and that $22rmillion was allegedly overpaid to Nursing Homes by
the same department, then I would be looking for reasons for this misappropri-
ation of government money by a government department. I would also check
on how many top health bureaucrats own apartments in Surfers Paradise, either
individually or with family trusts. How many top health bureaucrats own huge
land holdings outside the State in which they live? How many top health
bureaucrats have large and expensive farms in the State in which they live and
how many of them own and/or breed top class racehorses? I would also check
every computer technician for the same reason.
To date the Commonwealth Health Department has misappropriated
hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money and has not been asked to
give any accountability. In defence it has accused the medical profession of costing
. the governmentand health funds $100 million a year more than necessary and
offered no proof of these allegations. In this confused situation I think that the
due process of law will unravel the truth of Medibank fraud and point the finger
of blame back where it belongs—the true criminals in the situation—the health
bureaucrats. I
“There can be no moral form of Socialism”
Alexander Solzhenitsyn. _
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr D. P. Mackey
When I walked into the room this evening Dr Arnold came from the front,
tapped Dr Van Dugteren on the shoulder and congratulated him for looking after
the A.M.A. in New South Wales. Dr Van Dugteren said “I don’t look after things
here” and Dr Arnold said “Well, somebody has got to take the responsibility
for the mess we are in at the moment”. We are in a mess at the moment, and
I think a lot of our problems are due to the A.M.A. and the A.M.A.’s cooperation
with the government, negotiating with the government on non-negotiable issues
such as peer review, quality assurance etc. and many other matters that provide
a direct pipeline from the Treasury into doctors’ pockets.
There has been some confusion as to the role of the General Practitioners’
Society. I have also heard it mentioned that the General Practitioners’ Society
is similar to the Doctors’ Reform Society. I must reassure you that they are poles
apart. At least, the Doctors’ Reform Society is probably honest in certain aspects
of its policy—that it is a socialist organisation and claims socialist objectives,
while the G.P.S. is towards free enterprise medicine.
To reduce the confusion I think I should define some of the terms in private
practice that we use in the society. “Private practice” is defined as a fee for service
contract exclusively between patient and doctor with no third party involvement.
We want to practice without any third party, it is a one to one contract. The patient
pays the doctor directly and the doctor then issues the patient with an itemised
receipt and the patient, if he is insured, will claim from the insurance company,
i.e. as a re-imbursement. At the moment there exists a re-imbursement fallacy
in that although it is the patient who is insured and it is that patient that claims
back a certain amount, it is the doctor who is regarded as being the prime mover
of a particular service. If there are excessive services the Department of Health
comes to the doctor and says “We have defined this as unnecessary surgery so
would you please pay us back for unnecessary operations or over utilisation, pay
back this, this, and this” instead of going to the patient and saying “You have
seen your doctor too often according to our computer print—outs therefore you,
the patient, should pay back to the Commonwealth Government X, Y or Z”.
This confusion can be exemplified from the experience in Great Britain with
the British National Health Service. In 1970 the incidence of hysterectomies in
the UK. was published. There were X number of hysterectomies done on a
particular population of patients over a particular age, whereas in Australia there
were two X hysterectomies done on patients in the same age group. In 1970 the
conclusion was this: Great Britain has a rotten health service—the patients are
not getting the proper treatment; e. g. just look at the incidence of hysterectomies.
Of course, there were other examples; in Great Britain there were waiting lists
of years, e.g. a couple of years for a hip replacement, a year for a hysterectomy,
and I heard there was a 10 months waiting list for abortions! Today the
interpretation is a little different. The statistics are exactly the same: X number
of hysterectomies in the U.K., two X in Australia and the United States; therefore
we are doing too many hysterectomies, as in the U.S.A. We are a fee for service
group and we are exploiting our patients, we are over—servicing them, and we
are ripping out the collective uteri of all the women around just to get a few bucks
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to pay the tax man. This is the opinion that has been brought forward by certain
academic sophists in the community that at present grab the ear of the media.
There is a story of a doctor taking a social history from a patient for a
particular job and the doctor was asking the patient for his answers to the question
on the form provided: “Do you smoke?”, “Yes. Twenty cigarettes a day”. “Do
you drink?”, “Yes. About ten beers a night”. “What about sex?’f, and the patient
replied “Infrequently” and the doctor said “Is that one word or two?”. This
typifies, in a lighthearted manner, the confusion that can occur in the medical
profession today when terms such as “over-utilisation”, which is a computer term
and is undefined, and “unnecessary surgery” are bandied around. If somebody
is breaching these undefined terms they are brought before Committees of Inquiry.
(Recently in Hobart a counsellor from the Commonwealth Department of Health
came to address a group of doctors. This question of over-servicing arose and
the counsellor said “We look at the computer print-out and we can tell by the
resulting histogram if a doctor is doing too much of a certain procedure, or seeing
the patients too often”. He was asked “What happens then?” and he said “I
go and see the doctor and I counsel him. Now, if he agrees that he is doing the
wrong thing and he agrees to change his ways then nothing further is done. If
'he doesn’t I make sure he goes to a Committee of Inquiry”. Here we have the
counsellors judging these doctors guilty until proved otherwise, andthat seems
to be the opposite of our concept of British justice.
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MEDICAL BENEFITS FRAUD AND OVERSERVICING—
PRIVACY—DOCTORS AND PATIENTS.
THE INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE HEALTH FUNDS
IN THE PATTERN OF SERVICING.
R.J. Findlay, B.Ec.,
Assistant Director—General of Health,
Commonwealth of Australia
A major objective of any Government underwriting a health insurance
program must be to contain the cost of that program. The Australian medical
benefits system is an open—ended one—there is no limit on the total amount that
is payable—and, without the constant monitoring of costs, there is a risk that
it could absorb an ever-increasing proportion of our resources without any real
increase in the health standards of the community.
The total cost in 1980-81 of services attracting Commonwealth Medical
' Benefits—including amounts paid by registered medical benefits organisations
as fund benefits and the amounts that patients had to meet—approximated $1,450
million in respect of some 86 million private services. The cost to the
Commonwealth of medical benefits payments was $529m in 1978-79, $621m in
1979-80 and $683m in 1980-81. In the current year it is expected to be $820m.
The Government’s principal thrust against runaway medical benefits
_ expenditure is through the procedures that have been fixed for the settlement of
the schedule of fees for medical benefits purposes. Another is in the area of medical
manpower studies and another—the concern of this paper—is in the development
of procedures to combat fraud and overservicing by doctors.
The term “fraud” is used here, for brevity, to refer to an offence under
s. 129 of the Health Insurance Act which provides, inter alia, that a person shall
not make a statement that is false or misleading in a material particular in
connection with the payment of an amount under that Act. The section is obviously
breached by practitioners who, inter alia, bill for services that were not provided
or for services attracting greater medical benefits than those services that were
actually provided.
“Excessive services” are defined by s. 7908) of the same Act as services for
which medical benefits are claimed, and which “are not reasonably necessary for
the adequate medical care of the patient concerned”. Thus, while the identification
of fraud may be a relatively clearcut matter, the question of whether or not services
are excessive is clearly one for subjective professional judgement. This is provided
by formally established committees comprising five medical practitioners, four
of whom are in private practice, reflecting a wide range of general and specialist
practice.
The Government believes that the medical profession should as far as
possible be self-regulating in its participation in the Commonwealth’s health
delivery system recently. As the Minister for Health, the Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar
told the Australian Medical Association:
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The medical profession is well respected within the community and
the Government will work with the profession in maintaining these high
standards of ethical conduct. As a corollary to this, members of the
profession who abuse or defraud financial arrangements put in place by
the Government should realise that they can expect no sympathy . . .
. . . The participation of the profession, collectively and individually,
in controlling abuse is essential if the current arrangements are to survive
in the long term.1
The Extent of Health Insurance Abuse
Every so often, the media report the case of a doctor who has been found
guilty of a number of charges of health insurance fraud. The relative infrequency
of these reports, and the number of charges involved in each case, may also imply
that such fraud is relatively minor in extent. Similarly, there are occasional media
reports concerning doctors who have been found to have provided excessive
services. It could reasonably be concluded from these reports that overservicing
is neither widespread nor significant. '
Such conclusions may be incorrect but as yet there is no certainty in the
amounts involved. Recently, there have been many figures bandied about by many
organisations and it has been claimed that fraud and excessive services are
responsible for the loss of millions of dollars to both Government and health
insurance organisations. It is emphasised that, as yet, there are no hard figures
on this although it is obviously an area of great concern to the Government and
the Department of Health.
Current Methods of Detection and Control
The Department of Health has recently introduced a computerised fraud
and overservicing detection system (FODS). Previously, detection of fraud and
overservicing was possible only by following cumbersome and time-consuming
manual procedures. It should be stressed that the Department is concerned only
with those services that attract medical benefits. It is not concerned with services
provided outside the medical benefits scheme such as those associated with
cosmetic surgery or health screening.
Under FODS a statistical summary, known as a scan profile, is capable of
being produced each quarter for each doctor who has had claims lodged during
that quarter for medical benefits for a medical service which he provided. The
scan is a one-page summary of a doctor’s servicing pattern, as compared with
that on average of a selected peer group; as indicated by claims for medical benefits
over a three-month'period. There is no suggestion that doctors should be required
to conform to an “average” pattern of servicing. A profile does no more than
highlight a different pattern of practice which may warrant a special review. Where
fraud or overservicing is suspected, the profile should assist in directing
investigations to specific areas of concern.
Investigation of fraud or overservicing can be initiated in a multiplicity of
ways. These are too many to list but certainly include Departmental clerical
1. Address to the Federal Assembly of the Australian Medical Association, Sydney on
15 June 1981.
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checking of claims for benefits, particularly bulk billing, both in processing centres
and the offices of the Department itself; complaints from patients (and these are
the most difficult to assess); complaints from health insurance funds; complaints
from other doctors (or surprisingly, on occasion, from partners); complaints from
staff ofthe doctors concerned. No complaint can be ignored but the Department
is well aware that many, particularly from dissatisfied patients, are either frivolous,
malicious or without foundation.
If the examination of a doctor’s profile and any other relevant information
suggests that fraud may have occurred, the case is listed for an investigation which
may include the examination of original claim documents and, possibly, the
interview of patients. This procedure is explained later in the context of
consideration of a hypothetical case. If the examination of the profile indicates
that excessive servicing may have occurred, it is probable that the doctor concerned
will be invited to accept counselling on his billing practices.
Counselling
The Department of Health employs seven doctors as medical counsellors.
It is their general function to facilitate communication on medical benefits matters
between the Department and members of the medical profession. A principal duty
of these counsellors is to visit doctors and advise them on acceptable billing
practices. It is not the role of counsellors to tell doctors how to run their practices,
or to intrude into doctor/patient relationships, but they do indicate, in the
circumstances of any particular practice, the level of servicing that is considered ‘
acceptable where medical benefits are claimed.
Counselling is usually provided in three situations:
a. advising new graduates and doctors from overseas on the operation of
the Medical Benefits Scheme;
b. routine visits to doctors; and
c. remedial counselling, where there is evidence of excessive servicing.
Counsellors visit as many practitioners as possible to discuss their patterns of
practice and to obtain an understanding of the causes of any special pattern of
practice such as would be associated with a practice having a higher than usual
proportion of elderly patients. The counsellor is careful to ascertain the reasons
for any different patterns of practice, and, if there are not adequate reasons, the
counsellor will advise the practitioner that a variation of his pattern of practice
may be advisable.
Remedial counselling, including the giving of “warnings”, is undertaken
by medical counsellors in an endeavour to prevent overservicing. By agreement
with the Australian Medical Association the Department will not ordinarily refer
a doctor to a Committee of Inquiry unless a warning has first been given. It is
emphasised that the major role of the counsellor is early intervention, discussion
and prevention. If there is already clear evidence of fraud, the counsellor has
little role.
Medical Services Committees of Inquiry
The medical profession has co-operated with the Government in establishing
a Medical Services Committee of Inquiry (M.S.C.I.) in each State for the control  
29
 
of excessive servicing. These committees are made up of five doctors—four are
nominated by the ‘Australian Medical Association (A.M.A.), the fifth is the
Commonwealth Director of Health for the State. A second committee has recently
been established in New South Wales to assist overcoming the backlog of cases.
These committees are not courts; they are professional review bodies
instituted under the Act to advise the Minister for Health on cases of suspected
excessive overservicing. They are not empowered to impose material penalties.
Where they do find clear evidence that a doctor has rendered unnecessary services,
committees may recommend to the Minister that medical benefits should not be
payable for those services. In addition, they may recommend that the doctor be
reprimanded or that he be formally counselled.
As members contribute their efforts on a part-time voluntary basis (with
remuneration only for expenses), hearings are normally held in the evenings. The
adversary procedure is avoided, and every opportunity is provided for the doctor
or his representative to call witnesses, question witnesses, and address the
committee. Hearings are held in private and with as little formalityas possible.
The M.S.C.I. process in each instance is particularly time-consuming. The main
impediment to a speedy resolution of the cases is the apparent requirement that
each individual medical service must be considered in detail so that a determination
can be made as to whether or not it was an excessive service in the terms of the
Health Insurance Act.
M.S.C.I.’s commenced operation 3 years ago and have carried through to
completion 25 cases of possible excessive servicing. In 11 cases they have found
excessive services totalling about $185,000. There are 20 cases currently before
M.S.C.I.’s and another 30 waiting to be referred.
A doctor dissatisfied with a determination by an M.S.C.I. has a right of
review by a Medical Services Review Tribunal under the chairmanship of a
President who is or has been the holder of a judicial office or who is a legal
practitioner of the High Court or of a Supreme Court of not less than 5 years
standing.
Doctor X—A Hypothetical Case
A hypothetical case, deliberately one-sided, may be helpful in demonstrating
the issues confronting the Department in investigating an individual case and
bringing it to finality.
Doctor X, a general practitioner, decides to vary his billing practice so that
charges for the more lucrative services become more frequent. For general
practitioners, the most common item in the Medical Benefits Schedule is Item
14—a standard consultation during the day of between 5 and 25 minutes, and
the recommended fee is $11.20 in N.S.W. Dr X could charge his patients any
amount he liked, but $11.20 is the figure on which benefits are based and, if his
fee is Significantly higher than this, they will probably look for a doctor who
charges at a more reasonable level.
Instead he bills the patient for a different item from his book of schedule
fees—one with a higher medical benefit. For example, Item 51 (standard home
visit, with a recommended fee of $16.20) Item 25 (long consultation of 25 to 45
 30
minutes at $21) or Item 19 (after hours standard consultation at $17). If the patient
is a pensioner or a person in need, all that is required is the patient’s signature
on a claim form, and Dr X is paid at 85% of the schedule fee by the Department
of Health. If the patient is insured his health fund will reimburse all or most of
the doctor’s bill. In addition, Dr X advises his patients to return frequently for
observation, tests, pills or injections. Patients who can be persuaded that more
treatment is better treatment regard him as a good doctor.
Dr X can therefore charge for a large proportion of his services at a fee
level which, if operating in an unsubsidised, competitive market, would drive most
of his patients to other doctors. The public and private underwriters (that is,
taxpayers and contributors to health funds) pay his fees at a higher level and more
often than his patients would tolerate. There is no obvious incentive for them
to object to practices which benefit both parties to the doctor/patient relationship.
It is probable that for many, the signing of a form in a busy waiting room is
done with less than informed consent.
A facsimile of a simulated profile report on Dr X’s billing practice is on
page 36. The main table of the profile lists the thirteen most common services
of the doctor. In respect of those items, details of the number performed, the
number of patients involved and the income (schedule fee) derived are listed. In
addition, the ratio of services to patients is calculated and a breakdown of the
patient’s insurance cover and the way they are billed is provided. All this data
is printed beside equivalent data for the average of the doctor’s peer group. The
lower section of the profile includes histograms for the doctor and his peer group,
showing a percentage distribution of the number of services per patient in the
three month period. These histograms enable a quick visual comparison between
the doctor’s servicing pattern and that of his peers.
It is apparent from the attached profile that Dr X’s practice is considerably
different from the average for his peer group (that is, general practitioners in
N.S.W.). He performs significantly more Items 51, 25 and 19 than average, and
few items 14. His income for the quarter from medical benefits is over $25,000
compared to the average of $17,500. Fifty-three per cent of his services are
provided to disadvantaged patients, compared to the average practitioner’s ten
per cent. The histogram in the lower left corner indicates that Dr X saw more
than 25 per cent of his patients at least five times between July and September,
and 1.2 per cent were seen more than 24 times. The average GP. in N.S.W saw
only 8.5 per cent of his patients five times or more in that period.
The profile of Dr X’s pattern of services is sufficiently unusual to warrant
examination, so Departmental investigators proceed to collect a number of original
claim documents. The laborious examination of hundreds of these documents
turns up instances of suspected forged patient signatures, assignment of benefit
forms which appear to have had items added after being signed by the patient,
and other irregularities which support the hypothesis of fraud on Dr X’s part.
Departmental investigators call on some of the patients involved and ask
whether they can recall being treated by Dr X on the days indicated. Investigators
in such situations do not represent themselves as police officers, nor may they
call into question the professional competence of the doctor. Any statement made
by a patient must be voluntary. Not unexpectedly many patients refuse to co-
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operate as witnesses against their family doctor. However, a number of Dr X’s
patients state with certainty that Dr X’s claims for medical benefits on their behalf
are false. The Departmental investigators report that there is sufficient evidence
to discard a hypothesis of inadvertent error on the doctor’s part, and refer the
case to the Australian Federal Police for compilation of a prima facie case.
After conducting formal interviews of patients and obtaining sworn
statements, the police successfully apply for a warrant which authorises them to
copy Dr X’s accounting and patient records. These records indicate that Dr X
may have falsely claimed medical benefits in more than one thousand instances.
In most cases, these claims involve misrepresentation of the duration or
circumstance of consultations for the purpose of receiving a higher medical benefit,
but it appears that a proportion of claims were made for services which were not
provided at all. Dr X is arrested, appears before a magistrate’s court where he
enters a plea of not guilty, and he is released on substantial bail.
The police prosecutor’s case against Dr X is based on a selected fifty charges
of making false statements for the purpose of obtaining money, in contravention
of s. 129 of the Health Insurance Act. The amount of money involved in each
charge is small, usually under $20, but each charge must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It is obviously not feasible for the court to hear evidence on
over a thousand charges; even fifty lead to a prolonged trial. But as far as the
court and the public are Concerned, the Case against Dr X is a minor one, involving
less than $1,000. The evidence against Dr X on thirty such charges is sufficiently
strong for the court to find him guilty. Although some courts have imposed gaol
sentences in such cases, Dr X receives a sizeable fine and is ordered to repay $500
in benefits falsely claimed from the Government.
Prosecution and Recovery
Offences in particular cases under the Health Insurance Act may involve
amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to a hundred thousand dollars
or even more. Almost invariably these total amounts are made up of a large
number of similar instance offences involving $5 to $50 over some years. In other
words the same offence—for example, the exaggeration of the length of a
consultation—is committed many times, usually in relation to a number of services
for perhaps several hundred patients.
The nature of these offences therefore presents problems regarding both
detection and subsequent action by' the Department either in instituting a
prosecution or arranging an appearance before an M.S.C.I. Prosecutions and
actions for recovery are necessarily limited to a manageable number of charges.
The Department has found that for practical purposes approximately 50 instances
of an offence are the most that can be handled although preliminary inquiries
may suggest that hundreds of offences are involved.
It will thus be seen from the hypothetical case of Dr X that, in a high
proportion of authentic cases, the Department is confronted with great difficulty
in achieving at law an effect that it believes would properly reflect the totality
of the offences that may have been perpetrated. On the one hand, the limited
resources of the Commonwealth mean that it can pursue only a manageable
number of instances of a series of suspected offences no matter how many have
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apparently been committed; on the other, it seems that the capacity of the legal
system to deal appropriately with a case of systematic fraud involving a multiplicity
of relatively small amounts does not match the new levels of administrative
sophistication that are now available for the detection of such offences.
One possible approach would be the adoption of a procedure that would
permit generalised evidence—based on proﬁles and supporting documentation—to
be placed before the court when reparations are sought. Alternatively reparations
could be determined by a peer group which would have before it similar material.
As regards overservicing, an M.S.C.I. could be authorised to base its
assessment of its extent in a particular case on the “blowing-up” of the result
of a sample to a conceptual full practice. Another possibility is that services
provided by a doctor found to be overservicing could be precluded from medical
benefits for a set period. Such a measure could, of course, have serious
implications for the doctor’s patients. The usefulness of these and similar proposals
would require extensive exploration and, in any case, would need legislative
backing. They are certainly not part of Commonwealth policy at this stage.
Privacy
The issues of medical privilege and the privacy of patients are currently being
considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission as part of a wider
investigation into privacy and the law. In particular, a discussion paper entitled
“Privacy and Pe'rsdnal Information”,‘ and two addresses3 by the Hon. Mr Justice
M.D. Kirby to conferences of the General Practitioners’ Society in Australia and
p the Australian Private Hospitals Association have been helpful in identifying the
issues in relation to patient records. The proper balance between the interests of
the individual and the interests of the community where issues of privacy are in
question has always been a matter of concern to the Department.
As far as much of the work of the Department is concerned, the following
passages of Mr Justice Kirby’s address to the General Practitioners’ Society are
of particular interest:
In advance of the delivery of the Law Reform Commission’s report,
and indeed of the relevant decisions, I cannot inform you of our final
thinking on these topics. But two things stand out. First, the day of the
medical ‘lone ranger’ seems to have passed. The price of public funding
and escalating health and costs is inevitably pressure to monitor to some
extent the conduct of medical practitioners as this conduct impacts the
revenue: whether by frank fraud or, as is much more difficult, by eccentric
prescription patterns. Secondly, the privacy of the doctor/patient
relationship is still important for its success. Intrusions upon it should be
few. When they occur they should be handled sensitively and always with
respect for the intimacies of the patient, given usually upon an expectation
that normal privacy and confidentiality will be observed . . .
2. Australian Law Reform Commission: Privacy and Personal Information (Discussion Paper
No. 14), 1980. '
3. Law Reform and the General Medical Practitioner, a paper delivered at the 14th annual
conference of the G.P.S.A., Sydney, 21 March 1981. Doctors, Hospitals and the Courts, or
the Viewfrom the Witness~ Box, a paper delivered to the lst National Congress of the A.P.H.A.
Sydney, 22 June 1981.
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When it comes to access by Commonwealth officers to patient records
for the purpOses of investigating frauds against the Commonwealth revenue
or other offences provided for by Commonwealth law, ‘some diminution
of doctor/patient confidentiality seems inevitable. Even in the case of legal
practitioners’ privilege, so well entrenched and long established, the privilege
may be lost in certain circumstances where the dealing between lawyer and
client is itself fraudulent or criminal. It would appear to me to be too facile
to say that a doctor’s records should not be examined without his consent
(or even his patient’s consent) when investigating an offence alleged against .
the doctor or patient himself. ,
Otherwise, we could be committing investigation and enforcement of
the criminal law and breaches of statute to the consent of the very person
under suspicion or other persons upon whom he may sometimes exercise
influence.
At the administrative level, the privacy of the individual, doctor or patient,
is well protected. This protection is derived from several sources:
0 s. 130 of the Health Insurance Act provides legislative protection against
unauthorised divulgence of material concerning individuals.
0 with nearly all profiles, access to at least two sources of information held
by the Department is necessary to identify a doctor. Once identified,
considerable expertise is required to interpret the profile.
0 complete profiles of 'patients are very difficult to produce, because
information is stored by doctor rather than by patient, and very rarely
produced. Again, access to at least two sources of information, one of
which is not held by the Department other than for pensioners and the
disadvantaged, is required to identify a patient.
9 the authorisation of a Senior Medical Officer is required before profiles
are produced.
The Department itself is jealous of the confidentiality of personal medical
records that it holds. Correspondingly, the Department does not wish to have
access to professional medical records held by private doctors, unless it is
unavoidable.
In respect of suspected frauds relating to medical benefits access to personal
medical records, if these are kept separate from accounting records, would seldom
be needed. It is usually a question of fact that is involved in relation to possible
frauds; that is, whether in fact a particular medical service was Or was not
performed. For these inquiries, access to account books would generally be
sufficient.
In respect of overservicing which, as described earlier, is considered by
M.S.C.I.’s, elaborate procedures are taken to keep the identity of individual
patients private and confidential to the persons directly participating in the work
of these Committees. Both the Department and the A.M.A. believe in the integrity
of patient privacy and personal medical information. They are therefore both
concerned to ensure that there is no breach of patient privacy through procedures
associated with M.S.C.I. inquiries.
 To cover those occasions where the Australian Federal Police are required
to seize medical records from a doctor’s premises, senior officers of the A.F.P.
and the A.M.A. have agreed on detailed procedures for police to follow, so that
any disruption of a doctor’s practice and any intrusion into his and his patients’
privacy is minimised.
These procedures are as follows:
1. All records seized are to be marked and entered as an exhibit and stored
in safe storage. « '
2. All records will be photocopied, the photocopies being given to the doctor
concerned as soon as possible. If before the supply of photocopies, a doctor
urgently needed records for patient treatment, every effort is to be made
to respond to the need by supplying photocopies of the required records.
3. A patient whose medical record has been seized may wish to seek
information as to why his/her record was seized. A request for this
information is to be directed through the Commissioner’s office.
4. All original records are to be kept in lockable cabinets.
5. Keys to cabinets holding the records are to be restricted to no more than
two persons.
6. Records which are no longer required are to be returned to the doctor
as soon as possible.
7. The contents of all records are to be treated with the utmost
confidentiality.
8. Any movement of the records is to be recorded.
9. A member or other person is to sign for records given into his/her
possession.
The Department recognises the importance and sensitivity of the data to which
it has access to in the performance of its functions and any relevant
recommendations that the Australian Law Reform Commission may make in the
matter of privacy will be helpful in its continuing review of procedures.
Conclusion
The medical benefits scheme is, in the words of the Minister for Health,
based on trust:
“the basis of the fee for service” system of payment is trust—trust between
doctor and patient, trust between the profession and the community. The
community and the Government assume that each individual practitioner,
and the profession collectively, act ethically and honestly in the provision
of, and billing for, necessary medical care . . .
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. Your continued participation in‘ the development -of these
measures to control abuse, such as those measures designed to strengthen
Medical Services Committees of lnquiry,‘ has been well appreciated;
However, further measures may need to be developed and your constructive
participation in the development process will be essential.
The Department is therefore in regular dialogue with the profession to establish
the nature and extent of problems and the solutions that may be adopted. It
believes that co-operation with the profession itself is the most satisfactory way
of minimising illegal and unacceptable practices in an area so critical to the well-
being of the community.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
R..l. Findlay
I hope that it is clear that the Department’s paper is not directed to
denigrating an honourable profession. On the other hand, I believe it is not in
dispute that there are areas of abuse within the profession which are of a sufficient
magnitude to justify community concern and the consideration of gatherings such
as this. There are as yet no agreed hard figures on the extent of this abuse. Suffice
to say for our purposes that the Minister for Health did tell the A.M.A. Federal
Assembly earlier this year that concern was being expressed that the government
could be losing tens of millions of dollars. Ethical implications aside, the extent
of this abuse must have a serious impact on the level of our taxation payments
and on the level of our contributions to health insurance funds.
In clearing the way for general discussion may I make several points:
First, the Department of Health is not concerned with how a doctor chooses
to conduct his practice. The Department’s sole concern in accordance with its
statutory responsibility is with the billing by doctors for those services which attract
medical benefits. The cost of these services in the current financial year is expected
to be about $1700 million dollars. That is roughly twice the size of Tasmania’s
budget last year and slightly less than the whole Western Australian budget. It
seems to me that it is quite unrealistic to suggest that the billing procedures of
practitioners who are free to generate such massive expenditures, the bulk of which
is met by the government and by the funds, should be largely exempted from
monitoring or accountability.
Second, the Department of Health has no wish to initiate or promote a
criminalizing or prosecuting campaign. It would very much prefer that breaches
of the law did not occur and that any unsatisfactory billing practices that are
seen to be developing are nipped in the bud at an early stage. Indeed, an assurance
has been given that unless fraud or suspected fraud is involved a practitioner will
not be referred to a Committee of Inquiry unless he has first been counselled
and given an opportunity to adjust his billing practices where this is accepted as
desirable. To pursue its preventive approach the department employs medically
qualified counsellors whose business it is to advise practitioners in respect of their
billing for services that attract medical benefits. A counsellor would normally
seek to visit any doctor whose billing practices have given early warning that
undesirable features may be developing.
Third, contrary to what has been suggested, the Department has no
requirement that particular features of a practice should conform with the average
for the same features in the selected peer group. However, a significant deviation
from the average for a particular feature of a practice may indicate that some
investigation of its billing practices is desirable. This investigation may show that
fraud or overservicing has occurred. On the other hand the deviation may be quite
easily explained by a characteristic of the practice that is not present in all, or
some, of the other practices with which it is being compared.
Fourth, and turning to matters within the expertise of this gathering, the
Department has found that there are difficulties in securing at law penalties which
a ,, __l_.
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it believes are commensurate with the totality of the offences that may have been.
committed. With the staff that is available for the purpose, the Commonwealth
can investigate only a manageable number of suspected offences. This means that
where the pattern of practice may indicate that a multiplicity of similar offences
possibly all for quite small amounts has occurred, the Commonwealth may at
the most be able to prosecute, say, only 50 of these. As a consequence the court
would not be acquainted with the probable magnitude of the entire fraud and
on the other hand the Department is criticized for prosecuting doctors for relatively
trivial offences when in reality the amount of the total fraud may be many times
the amount in respect of which charges have been laid.
May I conclude, where the Departmental paper began, by drawing attention _ ‘
to the need for all concerned to contain the cost of medical benefits? If that cost
continues to expand to levels that our economy has problems in sustaining, then
a continuation of our open-ended fee for service medical benefits system could
obviously in the long run find itself under threat. The elimination of fraud and
overservicing by those people who generate this expenditure would be one step
in keeping the cost of our system within acceptable limits.  
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MEDICAL OVERSERVICING AS A CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
~ Professor Louis J Opit, B.Sc.(Hons), M.B., B.S., F.R.C.S., F.R.A.C.S.,
Professor of Social and Preventive Medicine,
Monash University, Victoria.
Any attempt to discuss the involvement of the medical profession in criminal
activity requires a starting point which defines crime within the legal framework.
It is a brave medical practitioner who debates matters of jurisprudence in the
presence of his legal colleagues, but it is impossible to escape this task. My reading
in this area has been provided by English law and English lawyers, so that if this
creates a false framework I can only apologise for this document, it was com-
posed in England. It is also obvious that, since doctors are also ordinary men
and women, I do not wish to discuss criminality in the contect of ordinary human
behaviour, but in the special context of the doctor as a professional person, with
particular tasks, and particular power and responsibility.
In confronting this problem, namely selective medical criminality, I found
myself between the realms of law and morality. Most legal authorities, although
acknowledging that law and morals do not coincide, believe their demarcation
is essentially impracticable and it appears to be necessary to understand some
of these arguments in general before proceeding to disucss the medical processes
themselves. It has been said that the seven deadly sins are not necessarily deadly
crimes since sin dwells in the realm of thought and crime dwells in the realm of
action. The law will not punish gluttony unless it makes a man drunk and
disorderly, nor will it punish sloth unless it makes a man avoid his taxation
responsibility. '
Law is said to be only the sum of rules of human conduct which the courts
will enforce and criminal law is public law in which the Crown is one of the parties
which set the law in motion. In para. 13 of the Wolfenden Report we find the
following definition of crime and criminal law:
Criminal law is to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen
from that which is injurious or offensive and to provide safeguards against
exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who are vulnerable
because they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced or in a state
of special physical, official or economic dependence.2
Criminal law is based on a moral principle, and consent is thus never, or almost
never, permitted as a defence. I believe, with Patrick Devlin, that private and
public morality are not separable issues.3
_ I wish to argue that every contact between patient and doctor, or in the
agency relationships between doctor, patient and paymaster (be it government
or health insurance fund), there is potential for criminal activity within the
 
l. Hanbury, H.G. In English Courts ofLaw, ed. D.C.M. Yardley, Oxford University Press.
London, l967, pp. 1-3.
2. Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution:
Command 247. HMSO, 1957, paragraph 13. .
3. Devlin, P. The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1965, page 28.
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definitions of crime in the Wolfenden Report. In the main I am going to discuss
what is euphemistically called private medical care, although some would say that
it is merely uncontrolled public medical care, but that is another argument. In
particular, I wish to discuss private medical care with third party financing since
this is the prevailing mode of care in Australia and one which governments and
the medical profession seem to desire above all else.
In this relationship the physician is expected to act on behalf of his patient
in the latter’s capacity of a benefit-receiver, while he is expected to act responsibly
in terms of an agency relation with the health fund which acts as a cost-bearer.
The physician retains all the decision-making power with respect to both patient.
and health fund. This framework is fraught with conflict of interest for the
physician. It is obvious that in a fee-for-service payment system the physician
has a stake in the consumption preferences of his patient—it creates his income.
On the other hand, it is part of the professed ideology of private medical practice
that vulgar considerations of cost ought not to be introduced into decision-making
about medical care. We can observe that the patient has few, if any, alternatives
from which to select his preferences and such preferences are acknowledged usually
only at the end of the decision-making process.
This is the framework in which we must discuss “overservicing” as a criminal
activity. I am loathe to use the term “overservicing” since it automatically assumes
the concept of “sufficient servicing” or “underservicing”. Instead, I would like
to approach the problem by discussing the nature and purpose of health care ser—
vice provision. The initial contact between a doctor and his client is usually initiated
by the client, his friends or family and it is this case which I wish to discuss.
Suppose a person feels unwell or unhappy and seeks the advice of a doctor. Once
contacted, the doctor then controls the process of care for this patient onwards.
We must assume that there is very little patient sovereignty, because the patient
usually does not know what he needs in a technical sense; does not know whether
the services he receives are those that he needs; nor is he able to evaluate the
technical proficiency of any services he has received. In the world of commerce
this sovereignty of the consumer exists to varying degrees and helps to keep the
provider honest. It is even supported by independent state-financed mechanisms
so that some uncertainty about expected quality may be resolved by reference
to this body.
For a patient there is no such independent quality assurance. There are,
furthermore, financial guidelines in the competitive world of commerce which
help to obstruct fraud, albeit incompletely. We do not expect to buy a Rolls Royce
for the price of a Mini Minor and if we are offered this opportunity then we may
expect the reasonable potential customer to be suspicious. Patients, on the other
hand, usually have no idea of the price differentials in medical care and in any
case, if they are insured, the price which they pay is not equal or equivalent to
the real cost of the services.
An even more important factor which renders the medical consumer
vulnerable is that in many cases they are, to quote the language of the Wolfenden
Report “young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced or in a state of special
physical, official or economic dependence”. In this state they are clearly not in
a position to question or argue. The medical practitioner is thought to have the
knowledge and practically has the authority to decide, and it is an unusual patient
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in our society who questions this authority. In our third party financing system
we can also observe that the doctor is paid for what he says he has done for the
client. In most cases this is very difficult or impossible to verify, so that dishonesty
may manifest itself by claim or by performance. Even when there is strong evidence
that the fee schedule has been misused to create the doctor’s account it is difficult
to proceed legally against him, and most insurance companies are unwilling to
do so. The Federal Government itself appears unwilling to act even on the sug-
gestions of its own advisory committees and these are not notably courageous
in their assessment of fraud.
It is necessary, then, to specify the way in which criminal activity can
manifest itself within the notion of “overservicing”.
I. Let us suppose that a physician persuades or encourages a patient to
accept consultation, diagnostic tests or surgical procedures, the main purpose
of which is to create gain for the physician. This gain may be financial but
cOuld also be reputation enhancement, a collection of cases treated in‘ a
certain way to be published in support of professional esteem. In my view
this action, if it could be proved, and that’s the rub, could lie within the
definition of criminality both because of its injury to the person receiving
the service and to society more generally through its effect on the contri-
butors to the health fund who bear the cost of these professional services.
There has been some passionate public and private debate, for
example, about “unnecessary” surgery. Those who deny that unnecessary
procedures occur do so by assuming that everything which the doctor does
is necessary and that it is the responsibility of critics to prove that some
are unnecessary. This seems to me to be a complete inversion of the moral
and technical responsibility of doctors towards their clients. The assumption
should be that all procedures are unnecessary, except in certain
circumstances, and thus “necessity” requires proof or argument. There are
phenomenal differences in some surgical treatment rates between countries,
such as the UK. or Sweden, where salaried services predominate, and
U.S.A. or Australia where subsidised fee-for-service medicine operates.‘
This suggests that the concept of necessity for surgery varies according to
methods of payment.
The legal proof that an individual received “unnecessary” treatment
is almost impossible to obtain. This proof will require the evaluation by
expert medical witnesses already steeped in the same ideology, and
adjudication by judge or jury, themselves potential clients of the same
system. The verdict is always likely to favour the medical practitioner and
the arguments become an inextricable mixture of technical and legal factors.
2. As I have suggested some crime comes about through the claim to have
provided services which, in fact, were not provided. This is straightforward
fraud at one level, but since it may injure the patient physically or
psychologically as well it may be more than fraud. This fraud may entail
4. Opit, L.J. Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into the Efﬁciency and Administration
of Hospitals. Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, Monash University,
November, 1979.
 using inappropriate (and usually more expensive) items to describe the '
procedure carried out. There are, for example, several different operations
itemised as, say, hysterectomy. These are not described prescriptively in
an unambiguous fashion but merely by title. A doctor may claim to have
carried out a “radical hysterectomy” and instead have performed an
ordinary “total hysterectomy”. This will increase his fee and refund and
it will be impossible to detect such a difference even where access is provided
’— to the report on pathological material obtained at the operation.
3. There is another form of fraud related in part to that described under
para. 2. This fraud appears to be widely practised on anecdotal evidence,
and it known as the “numbers game”. It consists of itemizing procedures
carried out, or said to be carried out, in a way which maximises the refund.
For example, a straight PA film of the chest can be described as an X-ray
of the chest and of the mediastinum. This entails, then, billing for these
items separately. This would effectively double the fee and refund value
of the X-ray.
An operation for which specific item numbers exist, such as Keller’s
operation for hallux valgus, may be itemised as six different consecutive
procedures, being the separate parts of the procedure, and this can triple
its fee or refund value. There are many such tricks available and few of
them are specifically excluded by the refund regulations. The detection of
this moral or legal fraud is also made difficult by the immense complexity
of the Schedule and the lack of enforceable guidelines with respect to its use.
4. Finally, there is another type of fraud which may occur. In this case,
medical practitioners treat one another or the families of another doctor.
The purpose of these treatments may be either to legitimise and subsidise
specialists’ training or as a bare-faced attempt to increase income by
conspiracy. These types of fraud have been widely suspected as occurring
in some psychiatric practices and action by peer groups within the College
of Psychiatrists has not been completely successful in preventing the
possibility of such fraud.
Once again, even when there is good evidence that such behaviour
is occurring, the difficulties associated with legal proof and the considerable
cost of failure to prove, have inhibited preventive action.
More recently there has been a change in the way people have been persuaded
to view the use of medical services. Our society is based on continuous and rising
consumption and the medical profession itself has joined the bandwagon of pro-
moters. Some persons now use medical care in a way that seems more akin to
conspicuous consumption of other goods and services (like restaurants, clothes
or cosmetics). The significance of this alteration in the view of the role of medical
care is profound. There is ample evidence that some persons are requesting their
own treatment and this need is directed at satisfying their own convenience rather
than for objectively verifiable illness. Since, in a third party subsidy system, this
consumptive convenience medicine is paid for by someone else, it is clear that
such actions, with the doctor’s compliance, can deprive other persons of the means
of financing their own private medical care. In this way we could regard this as
a form of exploitation and corruption.
1",
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In some respects it may be analogous to burning down your own shop, after
having first insured against fire, for the sole purpose of financing the acquisition
of another shop. I am not certain what the moral position of the doctor is in
this case. People may have the right to decide on treatment, such as cosmetic
surgery, for entirely narcissistic reasons.'lt is not clear, however, that this type
of service use should be forcibly financed by others and this increasingly common
approach to medical care, encouraged by the medical profession who clearly
benefit, may need philosophical, political, administrative and legal examination
to maintain our notions of equity in medical care provision. .
The operation of our so-calied voluntary health insurance system depends
on the assumption that doctors know best, not only for individuals but for society
generally. It also assumes that their honesty, competence and integrity are all that
are needed to protect the individual or the state from predatory clinical practice.
The mounting conﬂict between medical care as social welfare and private
consumption has not even been considered explicitly by government, health
insurance funds or the health care professions.
We can see, therefore, that declining standards of honesty and competence
could lead to the development of private medical entrepreneurs, subsidised from
the communal or public purse. This is manifest by rising utilisation and cost far
in excess of objective, determinable public gain. When, at the same time, the legal
processes may be more likely to act to protect those engaged in this type of activity
rather than the victims of such activity, ordinary citizens have cause to be
concerned.
It must be clear, then, that I believe there is a substantial amount of crime
perpetrated by medical practitioners in their relationship with their clients or pay
masters. I view some of the actions associated with overservicing as mala in se
not merely mala prohibita since they infringe the essential moral code. Patrick
Devlin observed, in writing about these:
crime means to the ordinary man something that is sinful or immoral, not
merely an offence which is a piece of misbehaviour.’
Unfortunately, the existing administrative and legal framework will almost
certainly maintain the difficulties in detecting and punishing these crimes. No
matter how much the legal framework of our health care system is straightened
(and it certainly needs a lot), the determination of how much overservicing is
criminal activity by the medical profession will depend substantially on the
framework of moral consensus. Tax avoidance provides a salutory analogy. lf
robbing the public purse can be construed as worthwhile and legal for some, then
effective change of legal definition requires the capacity to view the action morally
as well as legally; namely, that it is a form of theft.
The accountability of doctors to the community generally, or control of
their capacity to subvert the intention of law needs to be considered in structural,
administrative or political terms before the law can be used effectively to inhibit
fraud. We have no idea of the scale of such fraud and, indeed, it is part of the
 
5. Devlin, P. The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford University Press, London, 1965, pp. 31-33. -
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fraud that we cannot easily find out. In my view a good deal of the debate about
confidentiality relates to the desire of some members of my profession to maintain
this uncertainty.
It seems likely that whatever changes occur in the law, some doctors acting
as expert witnesses will have considerable inﬂuence over any evaluation of criminal
intent in others. In determining questions of, say, overservicing, we will have to
concede to whether such and such was “good” medical practice. Medicine, unlike
the law, is based on catechism, not argument. “Good” or “bad” medicine is
a convention which depends on the doctrine of our high priests. As I have observed
elsewhere, good medicine is now regarded as lots of medicine. Quantity has been
institutionalised as quality. Thus, good medicine is defined as the practice of good
doctors and good doctors are those who offer plenty of medical care. Good doctors
are also those whose prestige is obtained by setting the standards of good medicine.
The profession appoints it own peers through professional bodies and thus we
complete the circularity of our standards of assessment. It is clear, then, that our
expert witness evaluator will almost always be ideologically committed to main-
taining the status quo and is unlikely to see overservicing as more than a minor
misdemeanour.
These evaluators will also be under enormous moral pressure from colleagues
to favour the profession at the expense of whomever is plaintiff. I must confess
that I do not believe that legal changes alone can materially reduce the type of
malpractice or fraud that I postulate. The existence of predominantly fee-for-
service private practice, coupled with a complex schedule of refunds subsidised
by a third person, provides an irresistible incentive for some doctors to maximise
utilisation and to perpetrate fraud. When this is coupled with changing public
expectation of the role of medical care, and while the public is being exhorted
to act narcissistically by expecting unrealistic outcomes from medical care, the
forces resisting change must triumph. The medical profession, through its various
professional bodies, has refused to even acknowledge the possibility that some
doctors act in a criminal way within our health care system. The Federal
Government and many health insurance funds also appear to wish to maintain
this myth even when there is, at least, some evidence to the contrary.
There is no doubt that a clearly articulated, legally rigorous agency
relationship defined between cost-bearer (government and health funds) and the
doctor decision-maker would reduce overservicing but there needs to be evidence
from government, health funds and the profession that such legal mechanisms
will be used without favour. At present the law probably provides more protection
for the professional medical criminal than for his victim.
The changes which we will need todetect and punish the medical criminal
within our present system may not be attainable without substantial loss of clinical
and personal freedom. They will certainly require the risk of some loss of
confidentiality between physician and his patient. The enforcement of moral
behaviour is made difficult when there is no specification of the moral values
which underly certain actions. There is, I believe, a famous comment made by
Cicero to the effect that in the end we are all slaves to the law for that is the
condition of our freedom. I suspect we will have to change markedly the
administrative system in which these criminal activities are encouraged before
the detection and punishment of medical crime is possible. This legislative action
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itselfwould be an expression of public moral values about the use and, payment
of private medical care. , '
Unfortunately, we can expect a high level of resistance from the medical '
profession to anything which interferes in its freedom of choice or its capacity
to earn income. In the past Australian governments have been unwilling to provoke
the antagonism of my profession even when they have suspected that benefits
for many ordinary Australian citizens would accrue. We may have reached the
point where we should consider whether a free society can afford to bow to the
dictates of a professional oligarchy and should perhaps consider an assertion which
Patrick Devlin made in his essay on Democracy and Morality:‘
-What makes a society is a community of ideas, not political ideas alone
but also ideas about the way its members should behave and govern their
lives.
‘ 6. Devlin, P. The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford University Press, London, 1965, page 89.
 PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Professor L.J. Opt"!
In the papers of the first two speakers (both doctors) there is the assumption
that the only sort of criminal acts are those which take place by patients. They
convey a picture of hordes of patients conspiring to make their doctors rich by
various sorts of fraud in the suburbs. Exactly what benefit accrues to the patient
from this action has not in fact been made clear to me but perhaps will be clarified
later. They seem to be unable to accept the notion that the medical profession,
because it has power, also must have responsibility to act morally and legally.
In addition, Dr Van Dugteren wants to lay the responsibility on lack of education.
In Australia we are constantly being informed about the excellence of
medical practitioners, about how Australian medical practitioners are the best
in the world. Nowhere in the world are there better doctors and yet, at the same
time, we are now forced to recognise that this implies that the excellence includes
neither intuitive notions of probity nor a capacity to understand quite simple
existing regulations. I find that this viewpoint reveals something worrying about
the value system of our professional bodies.
Dr Mackey also supports the notion that patients are to blame for fraud
and he asks the question “Who changed the once noble profession into a bunch
of crooks?”. This could be irony, but I doubt it. The answer seems to be that
there is a giant conspiracy between crypto—communists in the Department of Health
and patients, and the real purpose of health insurance is the subversion of the
moral principles of doctors.
The paper is concerned with overservicing and the issueas to whether or
not it is criminal. It is very dangerous for doctors, especially an ignorant doctor
like me, to discuss jurisprudence in front of lawyers but I have found it absol-
utely essential for myself to discover what crime is, and I want to avoid the term
“overservicing”. It is a bad term. I want to itemise, as I have done to some degree
in my paper, the illegal and immoral actions which can and which do occur, as
Mr Findlay indicates, in our third party fee-for-service medical system. This is
not to exclude bad actions from other systems, such as the salaried service, but
I want to comment particularly on the problems which our particular financing
and administrative structure creates.
In my paper I outline seven sorts of actions which can and which do take
place. That is not escape into any fantasy—all of these things occur.
The first action which would be encompassed by overservicing is where there
is a provision of medical services concerned mainly or exclusively with the welfare
of the provider. There is enormous discussion about “unnecessary” surgery. I
claim that this subverts the whole logic. In my opinion we should assume that
all medical procedures are unnecessary, and the onus is on the doctor to prove
that some are necessary—not the other way around. It is not only the money,
- which may be the gain when a doctor does 'Something mainly for his own benefit.
This wasteful provision is by far the most important group of overservicing states,
and it is the most difficult, almost the most impossible, to prove convincingly
before a court of law.
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The second group of actions is the misclassification of procedures. The
Commonwealth Schedule is mainly non-prescriptive. It provides titles and
associates a particular fee with the particular procedure and title. For example,
there are about seven different kinds of hysterectomy but it does not actually
state what any of these are. So that it is possible to note that in one year 30%
of 'all the so called “radical hysterectomies”, as remunerated, occurred in a State
with less than 10% of the population. There could be a logical, moral reason
for that, but personally I doubt it.
Thirdly, we have what is called the “numbers game”. I see it is called
“polyitemization” but all doctors know about this. When I used to be a practising
doctor I even may have done it but then it was called the “numbers game”. In
the “numbers game” you maximise the number of items, i.e. you reconstruct
a procedure which is given as one item and one fee by taking parts of the procedure
' and constructing a much larger fee. I actually have with me genuine accounts
sent to me by general practitioners where this procedure has taken place. There
are hundreds and hundreds of possibilities, and they are very hard to discover
unless you know a great deal about the Schedule and about medicine. Even when
discovered, establishing that this action is deliberate is incredibly difficult.
Fourthly, another sort of overservicing occurs when there is a straight-
forward conspiracy between doctors to treat one another or their families. To
detect this we would need fleets of private detectives. In some instances those
cases that have been detected have been discovered by that-method.
Fifthly, there is the straightforward fraud, which is claiming to have done
something you did not do. This is the most obvious example of fraud, but is also
amazingly difficult to detect. -
Sixthly, and I suppose one could regard it as in the terms of my brief, there
is the case where, in fact, doctors use hospital beds wastefully in a hospital which
they own themselves. That is a situation fraught with the possibility, at least, of
a criminal act.
The seventh type of overservicing and one which belongs to a very interesting
group, relates to the circumstances in which we have changed the way in which
medical services are presented and used by patients. It appears that, increasingly,
medical services are not being provided for illness but are being provided to satisfy
convenience and conspicuous consumption, and I believe that this phenomenon
will continue to be an important issue. There is no question that people have a
right to have done to themselves what they want; what is at issue is whether other
people should be forced to'pay for that convenience.
Having declared the possibilities that can occur, our problem is that we need
knowledge of the frequency with which these actions occur and of that we have
very little knowledge. The computer methods are hopeless for finding individual
cases, but useful statistically for finding the phenomenon. There are appalling
difficulties in detecting and proving the things that we know to be happening in
a manner which will stand up to the rigour of the courts. As I have indicated,
in many respects the courts protect the criminal, hence the fear of failure in
prosecution by health insurance funds or by other agencies. The Attorney-General
himself in a note reported to The Age indicated an unwillingness to involve the
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Department in prosecution 'on the grounds that it might lead to actions for
defamatory libel.
We have in our country an assumption that doctors know best for the
disease, for the individual, and for the State generally and I think we really now
must challenge this. Reliance on universal honesty, competence, and integrity of
the physician may, unfortunately, be unwise. We must not confuse a failure to
detect and a failure to prosecute with a lack of frequency. It is like trying to count
the murders by counting the convicted murderers, or the theft by the convicted
thieves. White collar crime is detected at much lower rates almost everywhere
in the Western world and it is part of the social economic bias of our whole
criminal system that we are much more worried about breaking and entering than
quite massive financial white collar theft.
I began my paper by trying to find out which of these actions is really
criminal, and I apologise to all the lawyers present because as a scholar of
jurisprudence I would not rate many marks. It seemed to me that if these actions
injured the individual directly or indirectly, or if they injured other persons
indirectly as a consequence, particularly as in most cases the victims are mainly
vulnerable to the power and authority of the practitioner through their state of
health or their state of mind, we would have to consider that at least some of
these actions are criminal. '
Finally, in my opinion, the detection, conviction and punishment of much
of the criminal activity is impossible, within the existing legal system. We have
lack of information because of the complexity of the Schedule and, in many cases,
because of a quite deliberately contrived legal mechanism designed to protect the
confidentiality of the patient but which actually maintains the secrecy of the
doctor. Proof, as I pointed out, requires adjudication by experts. The adjudicator
himself will be a man, a doctor,~a peer member, likely to have the same ideological
basis. He will also be susceptible to pressure from his own professional colleagues.
In addition there is an unwillingness of the vital “third party” to participate for
reasons which I have indicated. We definitely need changes in the law but, in
my opinion, most of the changes that are needed are administrative and political.
Some legal changes which seem possible are those which can define in a
rigorous way the agency relationship between a paymaster, be it government or
health fund, and the provider. This would tighten up the responsibility of the
doctor to the fund, a step which is badly needed. We also need vastly more publicly
available information about what is actually going with respect to the utilisation
of medical services. We need recognition that there are changes in the role of
medicine and in the nature of provision of medical services. I know that in many
respects what I am asking for (and one important outcome) will entail a loss of
the doctor’s clinical freedom, but in many respects the community’s preservation
of freedom may require the doctor to give up some of his.
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P.G. Ward, M.A., B.E.,
Senior Lecturer in Criminal Statistics,
University of Sydney.
As a person who has no particular interest (pecuniary or otherwise) in
defending the medical profession, I feel that I should make some comments upon
the present methods of computer screening used by the Commonwealth to detect
fraud and overservicing. In the example given of Doctor X the computer shows
that he treated only 492 separate patients compared with the average general
practitioner who treats an average of 793 in the same period. Whereas the average
G.P. sees each patient on average less than twice this doctor saw his patients more
than three times on average and charged for greater numbers of home visits and
other more expensive services more often.
This information was used to detect that Doctor X was a suspect and further
investigation proved that he was claiming fraudulently. This is fair enough. It
is obvious that persistent frauds will be detected by this technique and that the
should be detected and punished where possible.
The point with which I wish to take issue is: supposing that not one piece
of evidence was found to suggest that Doctor X has made fraudulent claims, would
he have been charged with overservicing? I wish to suggest that several G.P.‘s
may generate a profile similar to Doctor X’s who would not be committing fraud
and might also not be overservicing.
Consider an area such as the Central Coast of New South Wales or the Gold
Coast of Queensland with a higher than average proportion of retired persons
and pensioners in the community. Doctor X “squats” in a community previously
serviced by Doctors A, B, C, D, and E. The local community discover that if
they ring Doctor X complaining of chest pains or that somebody is unconscious,
instead of being told to call an ambulance and be taken to a hospitalin the city
10 miles away, they usually receive attention in a short while at their home. Doctor
X thereupon develops a practice consisting of an abnormally high proportion of
the aged in the district and a high proportion of pensioners. Because Doctor X
is squatting the other G.P.’s do not include him in their week-end roster system
so that he also ends up with a high proportion of week-end consultations. My
Doctor X'will end up with a profile very similar to the fraudulent Doctor X’s
and if the review committee who examine his case are professionals of the type
A to E he may well be charged with overservicing. Is he? -
This Doctor X’s methods may be costing the Commonwealth services more
and the State services less but it would be difficult to argue that his methods are
costing the community more (unless one argues that it is better to let pensioners
drop off with heart attacks as soon after retirement as possible). But the picture
painted by Mr Findlay of a pensioner popping in to see the doctor for a cosy
chat and signing a form to see that the doctor gets paid unnecessarily is not really
justifiable when the caseload is more aged than normal.
The basic flaw, as I see it, in the present computer program is that it makes
no provision for comparison by caseload type. As the present computer system
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presumably detects the patient by some form of medical benefit number it should
be possible to determine the age profile of the doctor’s practice and to use this
data rather than a peer group to determine the averages to compare his methods
with others. Such a technique should be just as likely to detect fraud and be far
less likely to falsely imply overservicing.
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I just thought I would make the point that having looked at the techniques
that are used, you could say that they could detect those people who are fraudulent
and people whom it is very debatable whether they are doing anything wrong.
I made the point that if you were to adjust the computer program you would
probably be able to make a differentiation between a group who have a different
profile because they have a different sort of case load or because they operate
in slightly different ways which I do not thing are unethical.
I also think that this just chasing of overservicing can lead to various sorts
of patterns of behaviour such as a doctor saying to every patient who has only
just come in once during that three months “Oh well you had better come back
in three months time for another check up” so he gets enough instanCes of one
call only per three months on his histogram. Patterns of behaviour like that, that
do not really, save anybody any money, make the histogram more acceptable to
bureaucrats. Also cutting out those people who by some definition are over-
servicing on the basis of just looking at the computer will mean that in the next
three months if most of those who have conformed, your average will move'down.
You will then have another group of non-conformists. I am not too sure if this
mechanical application of a computer programme without looking at other
circumstances is a good thing in the long run. I can see all these possible dangers
of defining overservicing more and more strictly until doctors may actually be "
underservicing.
 DISCUSSION PAPER
Dr Robert Stein, LL.M., Ph.D., A.Mus.A.,
Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney.
My major difficulties relate to the papers of Dr Mackey and Mr Findlay.
As regards Dr Mackey I would like to remark on what appears to be over-
statements of the case presented. It is said that the profession now has its own
court for the persecution of its members. I think it needs to be indicated that
such procedures as these are not new to the law and that they have often been
beneficial in some areas. I select as an example the most obvious case known
to lawyers The Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Act of 1935 which made
provision for the “Statutory Committee of the Incorporated Law Institute of New
SOuth Wales”. Under this Act, and otherwise, there are wide powers over activities
of the legal profession. Investigations may be conducted, warnings issued, and
approaches to the court may be made. In addition, suspensions and exclusions
from practice may be ordered. This has been shown to prevent the worst excesses
in which only a small group of our profession participate and it ensures a proper
regard for proper procedures.
I cannot see how a medical practitioner who conducts himself within the
law has any more to fear than the lawyer who likewise conducts himself within
the law which is nothing. Therefore, it seems to me that the accusations against
the Medical Services Committee of Enquiry are misplaced.
I pass over statements on page 19 concerning the fraudulent nature of the
system which to me does not appear to be demonstrated and the fact that it is
Parliament rather than politicians which introduces procedures of the kind
explained.
As to the reasons it just might be that it has been for the avoidance of abuses.
Perhaps the truth is too simple to be accepted. Secondly, my substantial criticisms
are that no answer seems to be provided in the paper, but I may have missed
it, to the mild criticisms and observations of Mr Justice Kirby quoted in Mr
Findlay’s paper at page 32. They do point, in my opinion, to abuses by some
members of the medical profession even if a small number of doctors only. A
shortage of murders does not seek to justify the abolition of the penalty for
murder.
Last of all no attempt is made to provide for Professor Opit’s remarks
”concerning the “tongue in cheek” fact that 'medical profession knows the'best
treatment for the patient, and it is the patient’s duty to accept the advice tendered,
without question. In the case stated the advice happens incidentally to be to the
financial advantage of the consultant and not necessarily to the advantage of the
patient. The example of the number of hysterectomies in Australia as compared
with the position in England, I believe, does call for an answer. This alone might
justify the existence of the Committee. One could say that I suspect two people
are being hijacked. First of all the patient, with unnecessary surgery and secondly,
the public purse for Commonwealth payments or the fund contributors who must
_ foot the bill resulting from an unnecessary treatment of a problem which may
not exist.
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As regards Mr Findlay, my difficulties arise here under the heading of
”Prosecution and Recovery”. There is a suggestion that generalised evidence be
accepted against Doctor X on page 31. It seems to me that this might be guilt
by guesswork. For example a percentage of abuses might be established which
is quite wrong and I believe the example presented by Mr Ward points this out.
In such a case Dr X would be paying for crimes which he has not committed.
My second difficulty relates to the same heading: to exclude a practitioner
from medical benefits as a penalty for a set crime. I do not see the difficulties
raised by the author rather I ask “What of country people?”. In an area serviced
by one doctor only and the use of this penalty, what would the patients do for
medical service attention? Would government provide them with relief service,
or would they have to pay the full price during the period of suspension?
Last of all and in passing, under the heading of “Privacy”. Thereis a great
difficulty I believein the use of words such as“as soon as possible”, which appears
in points 2 and 7 (page 34), “every effort is to be made”. I think experience
of the lawyer suggests that unless the duty on the complying bodyIS mandatory
compliance with a request for cooperation will not be forthcoming for a multi-
plicity of reasons such as:—— “pressure of work”, “every effort is being made”,
“the materials may be required in the future”, or the standard form of one which
I have run into on numerous occasions “we have lost the lot”, to name a few.
I think these and other issues require to be answered before the papers can be
accepted as, I believe, a satisfactory comment and proposal upon servicing and
fraud and the rejection of a committee of enquiry.
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DISCUSSION
Dr. Peter Arnold, General Practitioner
I am particularly pleased to be here today, because when Medibank was
mooted I wrote an article called “How to Rob Medibank Blind’”. That article
was taken from our magazine and reprinted entirely in the Editorial pages of the
Sun-Herald. As a result many people saw the article. I ended up by saying that
a general practitioner who wasla little unscrupulous could earn half a million
dollars a year.
We had a very interesting reaction to that article. The Minister for Health,
who’ had seen a preliminary draft, said it was written tongue in cheek, the A.MA.
said it was a terrible thing to do because it was going to be tempting doctors to
be corrupt.
One of the wisest things that has been said at this seminar was by the last
speaker who pinpointed something which has not been noted by the main speakers,
that it is all very well wanting to catch the “crooks”, to find methods of detecting
them, to change the law so that we can penalise them and so on, but nothing
has been said about prevention. I think this is really vital. The reason why we
have fraud, the reason why we have overservicing is quite simply that there is
a third party paying, and in most cases of overservicing and fraud the third party
is paying almost, if not all, the entire fee.
When he was here recently Milton Friedman was asked what to do about
this sort of thing and he said “It is simply a matter of insurance. Any decent
insurance company will stop overservicing and fraud by insisting on co-insurance”.
Here we have the most ridiculous situation which we should have learnt from
Canada—we have a third party paying everything. Specialists who charge high
fees are quite happy to accept the patient’s benefit rebate as full payment, because
it is only about $5.00 off the fee anyway. We have a wonderful system which,
as one of the speakers said, is totally open-ended and it gets abused because the
patient is not paying a cent.
One of my particular unhappinessesIS the Medicheck system in Sydney.
When my patients ask for a referral I refuse. All our referral forms are stamped
“Not valid for Medicheck” (it does not mean a thing legally). When I ask them
“Would you go to Medicheck if you had to pay the full fee of about $120.00?”
they reply “Of course not, but it is only going to cost me $3.00 if I go there and
claim off medical benefits”.
I think the answer to most of what we have heard today is co-insurance.
The patient should pay something significant for each and every medical service.
Where a doctor wants to give a free service to the patient he should not get the
medical rebate either. Let it be a free service as it used to be in the days of honorary
service and in the days before we had health insurance when we treated so many
people for nothing.
 
l. The Australian G.P. January 1976.
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The other point which I must take Mr Findlay to task for is, I suggest, that
it is somewhat fatuous to say you are not concerned with how doctors practise
medicine but you are concerned with their billing. In fact the two are pretty
indistinguishable. Because ifl see a patient for 5 to 25 minutes you tell me I must
put down an item 14 if the patient is able to claim and it is not a health screening
or similar procedure. In fact, you are very concerned with howl run my practice,
and if I do decide to run my practice where I have lots of long consultations you
are very concerned with the number of item 25’s. I think that it is really not an
acceptable comment that you make at all. In fact it was ruled out by the High
Court in the B.M.A. case in 19492 because the financing of it is very much a factor
of the way in which medicine is practised.
The last point I want to make concerns the question of accountability and
confidentiality. It is very difficult to have a system which takes care of the patient’s
confidences to the doctor. We already have the police able (maybe they have been
for a long time, as our lawyers tell us) to raid psychiatrists’ and doctors’ surgeries
and take the records of their patients. We have a situation where the patients
are not telling because they are scared records may be taken, where doctors are
not writing down important information because they are scared records may
be taken, which really makes a farce of the medical records system—you do not
really know what the patient told you last time because you cannot remember
everything. At the same time we have the auditor-general who wants to be sure,
and quite rightly so, that his money is being properly spent. What we must realise
is that we have to try to combine these two things. We must have respect for
confidentiality. I can’t see why the Health Department cannot get the patient’s
permission if they wish to know about the patient’s records, and I can’t see that
a doctor can say, “No” once the patient gives permission. I think that would
be a great help to them. I can’t see why the Minister and his administrative officers
could not have a system whereby patients, people in general, are told “If you
wish to be eligible for medical benefits you must give authority to our Department
to get confidential information from your Doctor”. Every insurance company
does that, e.g. if you take out a life policy, or a sick and accident policy, you
sign a paper that says you authorise the release of confidential information.
Something that has upset the bureaucrats is that in our practice, our prescriptions
are over printed (we do not use the government ones) with a warning which says
“The information on this prescription is processed by government computers and
may result in invasion of your privacy”. This is something that people must be
made aware of. The government is giving them something but in exchange it wants
confidentiality—let the government be honest and ask for the confidentiality.
Don Weatherbum, Mitchell College of Advanced Education
I would like to make the point that it is a curious feature of the medical
profession that they would like the patient to pay to keep the doctors honest i.e.
in order to stop the doctors ripping off the patients you arrange things so the
patient has to pay. I think it is just typical of the way the medical profession
tries to organize its ethics.
2. Federal Council of the British Medical Association in Australia v The Commonwealth of
Australia (1949) (79 C.L.R. 201-295).
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Dr H.L. Soper, General Practitioner, Revolutionary, Libertarian, Executive
member of the General Practitioners’ Society in Australia, Editor of the General
Practitioners’ Society News, Editor of the Libertarian Digest.
To reply to Dr Van Dugteren: The A.M.A. speaks with too many voices—
how can it represent State salaried people and private practice? It is quite
impossible and I think that it is overrun with what could be called crypto-socialists
(crypto-communists are the same thing)—they are under every bed—the whole
argument is political. These services are supplied to gain votes for politicians.
Why apologise for it? They know what they are about, we know what they are
about. The overservicing at Nowra sounded to me like a lot of damned hard work
and apparently the Health Minister finds high medical incomes odious. The best
thing to do is to put more doctors on—he has woken up to that fairly late.
In considering ethics of the medical profession and honesty: As much as
the Morgan Gallup poll is worth we are now up 1% to 63°70 in probity and ethical
behaviour, politicians at the State level are down 4% to 16%, at Federal level
down 1% to 15% and lawyers are 38%, police are up 8% to 56%, union leaders
8% and car salesmen 3%. I do not make any apologies about the general view
of what our probity is, in spite of the crypto-communists that have been speaking
today.
To reply to Dr Mackey: The A.M.A. is definitely in cooperation with the
government. The A.M.A. in asking for government subsidy abrogates the free
market. There is only one arbiter of excellence and that is the free market.
Anything that is worthwhile will survive and anything that demands government
subsidy should go down. So we have theft of our resources, our life, liberty and
property to pay for something so that the glad-handing politicians can get votes.
Computer print outs: Dr Mackey has had some experience with these. They
are quite erroneous. We have forgotten the simple aphorism about computers—
“garbage in—garbage out”. And yet, you try to convict decent people who are
held in high regard in the community. I know there are some bad apples
everywhere, but let the patient look after his own financial affairs, as has already
been argued against, and he wants to rob me to take my hard-earned dough to
pay his rotten medical expenses. Next thing he will want food, then housing and
so on, and as in the communist state the thing runs down and nobody does
anything. You destroy capital, you destroy the country.
To reply to Mr Findlay, the government is losing tens of millions of dollars
into the non-productive bureaucracy which is engendered by these political
handouts—32°70 of the population work for the government, 10% are on pen-
sions, 6% are on the doleIWe have got an inbuilt system for crypto-communism
and crypto-socialism where the government constantly robs the productive people
of the community, and I include amongst those thedoctors—the free-standing
doctors who want nothing to do with the government. They do not go to the
government for subsidy and support.
Only the truly indigent need State aid and then you have much less
opportunity for fraud. People that are really poor, not some artificial poverty
line, but people that have no money, no anything, are the only people who require
State aid. This is the basis of the free market. Once you have got a key into the
 57
commissary nobody wants to work. The penalties for the fraud against the
government have been miniscule.
In reply to Professor Opit: Patients do initiate services by the simple law
of supply and demand—where something is free the demand is infinite, and that
is precisely what is happening.
Our probity is supported by the general public, but within the general public
you do have “something-for-nothing merchants” who are encouraged in this by
government. The government takes my property, your property, on behalf of
those people and gives them handouts. Even that would be alright if it were a
two-way street, but unfortunately there is a voracious intermediary and that is
the bureaucracy. Therefore, the government in supplying you services always gives
you a lot less than you could get yourself. Private medicine is not only better
medicine, it is cheaper medicine. It has been proved many times. Fleets of private
detectives are not necessary where the patient pays his own bills—he monitors
his own expenses. The order of a free market comes from the simple contract,
and the regimentation of the socialist governments leads to chaos.
Dr Joan Asher, Chairman of the N‘.S.W. Committee of Inquiry.
One question that has received little comment and was raised by Professor
Opit, does concern me in my position. Professor Opit noted that in many cases
when one is dealing with these allegations one exposes evidence of medical practice
that is greatly to the detriment of the patient. There is no current mechanism by
which we can act on this in any way. There are no official channels by which
this can be referred on to the authorities who have the ability to deal with this
situation. That causes us equal concern.
Dorothy Howe
I want to be a moralist. I agree with Dr Van Dugteren, the essential factor
in fraud is that the bill is issued which can gain a rebate for services supplied
and not supplied. The fund is open to be “milked”. In my dental practice with
my husband the normal way to make a claim from a fund is that the patient pays,
a receipt is given, and the patient gets the rebate. If this was done we would not
have a problem. The patient receives an account, presents it to a fund, the cheque
is made out in the dentist’s name, and the patient is asked sometimes to pay the
difference. I have proof that the receptionists at the fund make the cheque out
in the patient’s name. Everyone knows how simple it is to join a health fund,
no identification is required, no birth certificate is required, and legal or illegal
people other than the contributor may be covered, so the funds leave themselves
open to cheating in small and large ways. All you require to get an illegal rebate
is a dental account form. A scheduled item number form is supplied by the
Australian Dental Association, it is sent out with every account to explain to your
patient what those numbers mean. But, the criminal who wishes to cheat can have
this form printed.
I agree with Dr Mackey‘that in this confused situation of changing medical
and hospital funding the health fund bureaucrat is the true criminal in the situ-
ation. I cannot get an article published which shows how much the funds can
be cheated and how easily they can be cheated. How can we have an honest fund
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for the people? We; have to have insurance, and we have to have everybody’s
name registered who are eligible on that insurance policy.
Dr Jodhi R. Menon, Member of the National Committee, The General
Practitioners’ Society in Australia, N.S.W. Spokesman and Editor of “The
Australian G.P.".
I wish to reply to the question “Why do we want to make the patient pay
so as to watch the doctors?”. One simple lesson that we all have to learn is that
doctors are not gods, and patients are not angels. This is one of the fundamental
causes of fraud, and we in the Society have no sympathy for fraudulent doctors.
We admit that in any cross section of the population, including doctors, there
are crooks. When I once made this accusation, the interviewer said “You are
making a serious charge against your colleagues—your own kith and kin”. I said,
“We do not wish to count any criminal doctors as our kith and kin. We would
rather have them found out and tried like common criminals”. The
Commonwealth policemen have all failed miserably. The A.M.A. policemen and
the Committees of Inquiry have all failed miserably. The only effective policeman
is the patient. I dispute with Professor Opit that no patient would dare question
the doctOr’s authority. If a patient had to put his hand in his pocket he would
want to know what he was paying for. When he does not have to put his hand
in his pocket he doesn’t really care what he is paying for or how much he‘must
pay. In the same way, I know nothing about motor cars but when I am presented
with a bill of $325.00 I want to know exactly why. If I did not have to pay that
bill myself I Would not be particularly interested.
Don Weatherbum
There is one similarity that strikes me between the medical profession and
the used our profession, and that is they both deal in their respective concerns
as if with objects which demand a particular price—I think that is about as far
as it goes.
In my limited experience with doctors as a patient it is very rarely that I
receive a clear answer to the question “What is it that you are giving me for the
money that I am paying?”. Usually some sort of obscurantism follows
immediately. I hate to think what happens to people who are less articulate. In
summary, I think it is quite false to say people respond to doctors as they would
to people supplying a bill for reparationuto an automobile.
Professor L.J. Opit
There is one point I would like to make because two of the G.P.S. speakers
have referred to “proper insurance”. I suspect that really none of them know
what proper insurance is. Proper insurance, in fact, sets rates according to the
risk; so‘if 65-year-old people wish to insure they would be paying something like
ten times the premium of 1—5 to 20-year-old”people. The speakers from the G.P.S.
have also constantly failed to introduce the notion of probity, the idea that greedy
. doctors could have something to do with the overservicing. They may not see
anything wrong, in terms of social justice, with a medical system which made
-‘?‘~.-old people pay ten times as much as young people, but most people, certainly
most politicians and governments, would never accept such a scheme. I think it
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would be sensible to get rid of the idea that proper insurance is what health
insurance is about. Health insurance is, if anything, extremely improper insurance
and will always be improper insurance.
Dr P. Arnold
I must rise to Professor Opit’s bait and point out to him that he is really
confusing two very different things. The one is “what people can afford” and
the other thing is what governments would like to do so that they look good.
I see no reason why a 92-year-old patient, if he is wealthy, should not pay proper
fees.I think what we are seeing is that old disease—where there is a problem,
there must be a solution. I come from South Africa originally. Whenever people
have said to me over the 20 years I have been here “What is the solution?”, I
reply “There is none” but they say “There must be a solution”, and they will
not realise there is no solution. Similarly there is no solution to the Arab/Israeli
conflict. There are a number of possibilities, a number of changes may take place,
but there is no solution. Unfortunately many people, particularly in government
and universities, believe that if there is a problem there must be a solution.
What we have been saying for a long time is that health insurance is like
any other insurance, and there is no reason why if people cannot afford to have
insurance they cannot get State assistance. You do not see the government assisting
people to insure their houses or their motor cars or their clothes or jewellery,
but health has got to be special. There is something sacrosanct about health, that
we have to go overboard in a stupid system which allows everybody free access
to government money regardless of their means. Why on earth should rich people
be subsidised by taxes paid by poor people? It does not make any sense. Let them
pay themselves. There are very few countries as wealthy and as affluent as
Australia, and yet when it comes to health insurance we behave as if we are
Kampuchea or some benighted South American republic where everybody is so
poor that the government must help them all. This is sheer lunacy, and the
relevance of it is that these same arguments arise all the time.
In reply to Mr Weatherburn’s point that some doctors are dishonest—some
lawyers are dishonest, some University professors and lecturers are dishonest,
some staff of College of Advanced Education are dishonest. I am not denying
that, and I wrote the article originally to expose this dishonesty. What we are
saying is that it is stupid having a system which allows everybody to abuse it.
One lady in Toronto went to 85 different consultant physicians before she found
one who gave her the diagnosis that she wanted. If that isn’t abuse then what
is? We have the same thing here. People want to go to Medicheck, to specialists,
to their gynaecologist, a routine yearly check, and so on. They come in and say
“I want to take my child to a paediatrician because it has a sore throat”. In general
practice we get this all the time. Let us look at the abuse honestly. The abusing
people say “I am entitled to it. I pay medical benefits. I don’t care what it costs.
I am going to the specialists”. This happens all the time, with respect to Professor
Opit. We have to realise the fault lies in the system. Let us help those who cannot
afford health care and let us direct government effort at the small percentage
in Australia who need help, but to spread it universally is just plain crazy.
Finally, concerning the question of the computer. I hope the Medical Board
will forgive me for saying this, but in my practice, where I have been 15 years,
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we accept no money at all from anybody- except the patient. We will not accept
cheques from insurance companies, from medical funds, from Medibank, from
the Government Insurance Office, or from anybody other than the patient. We
do not give out itemised accounts, we give out an itemised receipt. The patient
pays us, they get a receipt, and they do what they like with that receipt. If they
are insured they claim, if they are not insured they do not claim, that is their
business. I recently had a discussion with the N.S.W. Health Department. I asked
for my profile and found a lot of item 3’s (short consultations—less than 5
minutes), and a lot of item 25’s (long consultations—over 25 minutes). What has
been happening to general practitioners is, they are told: “Your computer‘profile
shows too many long consultations. You are writing down item 25 when in fact
it was not 25 minutes. You are cheating”, orthey are told “You have too many
item 3’s, therefore you are charging for prescriptions”. I do charge for
prescriptions, $2.00 paid, receipt given, no item number. The reason why I have
so many item 25’s is that ever since the Department picked on a doctor in Western
Australia (who subsequently committed suicide) and I wrote a facetious letter
to the Bulletin about working to a stop watch, I have in fact done what my lawyer
does—I have a clock on my desk. I write down the time that the patient walks
in and the time the patient walks out. I have every consultation time and the
amazing thing is that, in my ignorance, I thought that most of my consultations
were under 25 minutes. I am now finding that a goodly proportion, far more
than I ever suspected, were over 25 minutes, so I find I have a great many item 25’s.
One must realise that where you have time brackets O to 5 minutes, 5 to
25 and 25 to 45, what does the GR do if, looking at the stop watch he sees that
it is 24 minutes and not 25, or the consultation took 6 minutes not 5? Does he
put down the item number according to the schedule he has been given, or is he
decent and moral and say, “It was a pretty ordinary consultation, I will stick
to the ordinary one”. These are real problems, and 1 think many of these problems
arise because doctors are not using a stop watch, and I would not expect them
to. I have been doing it for fun. But most doctors are not using a stop watch.
They are saying: “I think it was a long consultation”, or “I think it was a short
consultation”. These “simple rules”, that one of the speakers referred to,
following “simple regulations” are not so simple. It is often very difficult to know
precisely which of these literally thousands of item numbers to use. Professor
Opit I am sure would agree that it can be confusing to know which one to use,
because the items are not, as he said, defined in the schedule of benefits. What
is a particular kind of operation or what is a particular kind of fracture? There
are no definitions given and these vary from place to place.
I agree there are some crooks, I am not disputing that, but I think it is
fruitless trying to chase them. We need to change the system so that patients hear
more responsibility and they police the system because that is the best way of
doing it. Where the patients cannot afford health care let them get assistance.
So far as the doctors abusing the system is concerned, I think we have to live
with some doctors doing it and we have to try and catch the bad ones and not
allow them, as is the case of a couple in New South Wales who are well known
to the Department and to the Minister, to be so clever as to get away with it.
Dr Van Dugteren
I have been called a communist—that is quite delightful. I think there are
two or three matters that have come forward.
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As regards Professor Opit’s paper, I think I was taken to task for suggesting
that doctors do need education in regards to the law for the control and supply
of medical services. He felt that this should be intuitive, that doctors should
automatically know what is right and what is wrong. I was interested to note that
he himself had to refer to a law library to define crime, and goes to some
considerable trouble in quoting this in the opening of his paper.
The laws controlling medicine have changed almost day by day, not only
within the provisions of the Health Insurance Act, but at State level also. The
last time I lectured to medical students I referred to a minimum of 35 Acts,and
when we look at, for instance, the Crimes Act 5. 83, which refers to termination
of pregnancy, as to whether it is a crime or not depends on the use of the words
“lanully interferes”. Nobody as yet has determined what is the leVel of
“lawfully” in this State as regards an abortion, so we do not know what the law
is. Intuitive feeling is far from sufficient in determining what the code of behaviour
of a medical practitioner shall be. I think the fact that our universities have given
up the previous practice of medical jurisprudence as an examinable subject is a
tragedy. I also think that it is a tragedy that doctors from overseas are registered
and allowed to practice in this country without the slightest idea of what the
established medical system really is, and they are placed frequently in danger
because of that very fact.
When it is stated that “Committees of Inquiry have failed” I consider that
to be a statement without any backing to it. To what level overservicing would
actually occur without Committees of Inquiry is something of which we have no
knowledge. There is no true evaluation of what the position might be. It could
even be better without Committees of Inquiry because doctors themselves might
, not be stimulated to try and beat the system. Mr Ward’s paper refers to the feedout
from the computer and how that in itself can be misleading. Let us hope that
the day never comes when we have trial by computer. All the computer does is
draw attention to certain people within the system, and nobody likes that being
done to them. I did not enjoy it when I was investigated by the N.S.W. Department
of Health about 30 years ago regarding a patient. Fortunately, apparently I got
away with it. The essential thing, as we have Said (and the A.M.A. is violently
criticized by the G.P.S. for its attitude in that direction), is that the final recom-
mendation to the Minister must be by medical practitioners with knowledge of
clinical practice with a good level of discretion who are chosen by their
colleagues—that is those of their colleagues who support my Association (which
happened to be the vast majority). Those people judge, it is not just on a computer
feedout. But on those factors that Mr Ward has raised, for instance the type of
patients that are involved, e.g. at a practice from, say, Wyong up in the northern
waters area where you have an enormous number of retired people, and pen-
sioners, compared to the situation in the type of area where Peter Arnold practises,
and within that area a particular doctor, because of a certain charisma he has
as to older people, might have a practice that is totally loaded with retired people;
or you can be practising in a suburb where you have an enormous number of
disadvantaged people. It is up to the Committee of Inquiry, with their knowledge
of the variation of circumstances and with their knowledge of the clinical entity
of each practice, to make a recommendation to the Minister. There will be
arguments as to whether that is a good or a bad system. My association supports
that system. I know that the G.P.S. does not support it. We are all entitled to
have a variation of opinion, but it is perfectly obvious from the respective
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memberships that .-we do have a very high level of support from the profession,
and they would sooner be judged by their colleagues than by somebody who knows
absolutely nothing about our profession.
Dr. Raymond James, Psychiatrist (private practice), Brisbane.
As a Queenslander I am, of course, a member of the A.M.A. and other
right wing groups!
I would like to speak to the proposition that patients can look after their
own interests, or that actions by the patient can make the system honest. The
patient can, of course, complain to the Commonwealth Department of Health
which will then investigate or not investigate, and we have heard the difficulties
of that.
What I would just like to raise are the difficulties encountered by patients
who feel that they are the victims of medical malpractice. In those situations the
recourse to the patient is to take an action for negligence against the doctor. This
is enormously difficult in the present circumstances. Firstly, it is very difficult
indeed for patients who become plaintiffs in civil actions for damages, to get
doctors to give expert opinions in these matters. Secondly, the patient then has
to take the case to court and he is up against the doctors who are defended by
the medical protection societies which are very afﬂuent and well organised
“doctors insurance groups”. The attitude of these societies is often to take the
matter to court, and in that situation the plaintiff, who may be a middle class
person, must run the risk of losing because of the difficulties of getting opinions
in these areas. If a matter went to court over a period of perhaps three to five
days and the plaintiff lost, he would be up for costs of perhaps $30,000 to $50,000.
This really means that in bringing matters of medical malpractice to the notice
of the public issues are not debated in the courts, and therefore, through the media,
brought to public scrutiny because plaintiffs cannot afford the risks of losing.
The only people who could litigate these matters with any confidence would be
millionaires, whom I presume are not the victims of medical malpractice, or
paupers, who could get legal aid, but presumably do not realise when they are
the victims of medical malpractice.
Dr Van Dugteren
As far as legal aid is concerned we are obviously in quite different States.
In N.S.W. it is now a State legal subsidy through the State Legal Services
_ Commission, so, in fact, N.S.W. is in a somewhat different position. Previously
in New South Wales this was run by the Law Society whereas now it is by the
government.
However, the accusation of the “clOSed shop” is one important thing that
emerges when the patient cannot get a medical practitioner to give an opinion,
I know the G.P.S. is going to hate me because now we have guaranteed legal
aid for the patients. If they have difficulty in obtaining an opinion in a matter
under dispute, and where a patient is looking to obtain legal aid when they feel
they have a case for damages against a doctor, we have guaranteed to obtain the
cooperation of senior members of the profession in the particular discipline
‘ involved to assist in full examination and frank opinion upon that patient to legal  
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aid and if necessary to give future evidence in court. We are determined that there
will not be a “closed shop” in that direction in New South Wales. In fact, we
have also formed within the Branch a section of those doctors who are involved
in giving medical evidence fairly frequently. We have supplied the Law Society
(although we still have some gaps to close) with a list of those doctors who are
prepared to give their time in examining patients and giving medical evidence.
I know that some people do not have a very high opinion of the honesty of the
profession but I can assure them that those medical practitioners are giving an
honest and open opinion.
One hurdle that we have had to overcome is to ensure that there is a list
of people available. In some of the smaller, more exotic disciplines we do have
problems in finding an appropriate senior experienced person with the time to
go to court, remembering that loss of time can be a serious disruption of your
practice and your patients. I think we have covered that reasonably well and if
we haven’t covered an area we are doing our best to.
Pamela Rout/edge, N.S.W. Health Commission '
My point might now be redundant but I would like to support the comment
of Dr James about the viability of the notion of medicine operating in the market
place. I think there is substantial evidence that consumers, in fact, are not able
to operate in a market place medical situation, because they are not informed
about what is involved in a medical practice and they do not have the knowledge
or the skills to make informed choices.
My second point is that there is substantial evidence both from Canada and
the United Kingdom that selective provisions to cover the very poor, such as we
have recently introduced in Australia, simply do not work. The poor do not take
up these selective provisions, and this is evidenced by the lack of take up of the
new health care cards recently introduced by the Commonwealth. The number
of low income families coming forward to avail themselves of that provision is
way below the numbers estimated to be eligible to receive them, and the
consequence of this is that the very poor just do not use health services even when
they are often those most in need. It seems to me that for both those reasons
government must act in the medical care situation to ensure that people do have
access to health care and to protect the consumers who are not informed against
the sort of malpractice we have been talking about. I was wondering whether
the speakers could address themselves constructively to what sort of relationship
they would like to see between government and medical practitioners.
Dr Mackey
I would prefer myself to see no relationship between government and medical
practice. I do not think it is a proper role of government to be in medical practice,
but, if you do want government there then there should be a two tiered system
of medical practice, i.e. private practice with your fee for service doctors working
in their private rooms with private hospitals, and salaried government doctors
working in government hospitals. The two never meet—they will go along in
parallel lines. That, I think, would probably satisfy the wants of people who think
that private practice does not deal with the poor. That is quite wrong. The poor
appear to be the “achilles heel” of the medical profession. What are you going
to do about the poor? What are you going to do about the poor patient who cannot
 pay the doctor? What is going to happen? That is when the profession usually
goes to the wall because the poor are always going to be with us, some are going
to be poorer than others, some will not be able to pay not only the doctor, but
the butcher, the baker, and so on. But that does not mean that we should take
the argument to a collectivist conclusion. We should not argue from poverty to
collectivism to say doctors must be subjugated to government ruling on this matter.
In private practice sometimes the right and proper fee is no fee at all, and that
is the best way to practise.
His Honour Judge 1.1-1. Staunton, Chief Judge of the District Court, N.S.W.,
and Chairman of the Medical Disciplinary Tribunal.
Perhaps I may be permitted to attempt to divert your attention back to the
title of the seminar which is “Crime and the Professions” i.e. Medibank fraud
and other problems. I do that with some diffidence because I know it is far less
exciting than listening to polemics about the problems concerning health care,
but the criminal aspect of it, of course, remains a very serious one.
The point I would like to take up arises out of Mr Findlay’s paper in which
he states that in prosecuting fraud the Commonwealth Department does not seek
to attempt to prove or lay more than a selected 50 charges against one practitioner
(see page 31), even though the pattern may demonstrate a multiplicity of charges.
I do not wish to say anything about the problems of proving overservicing
difficulties, or about morality or about the criminal intent that is involved in that
action. I am more concerned with the straight out fraud because after all most
people can understand that fraud involves straight out dishonesty. Most people
expect that straight out dishonesty should be pursued and that it should be
punished. It does not matter what part of white collar crime it is, whether it be
solicitors or any other profession. It does not matter whether we are talking about
a person who steals from a house or steals in any other way. Dishonesty is a terrible
thing in this community as anybody who has had their house ransacked would
know. So I am concerned, although not altogether surprised, to find that this
should be the Commonwealth attitude. I do not think in the result that it is going
to serve the public interest if the Commonwealth attitude is restricted to this
somewhat narrow approach. I say that for two reasons. Firstly that the dishonest
should be pursued and punished, and secondly, it would be in the community’s
interests that, in the words of one of the speakers, “the rogues in the profession
be removed”. This can only be done in the case of fraud by conviction and
punishment.
To illustrate what I mean I take up a point made by Mr Findlay as to the
difficulty of proving this fraud and the mechanical problems associated with
presenting it through the courts. It seems to me that such problems should be
overcome because we are dealing with a huge amount of public money in the
system. It is well known, of course, that it is difficult to prove these matters.
If I could give you an illustration that came to my attention recently:— a doctor
was proceeded against in respect of, say, 28 charges of fraud and these charges
were vigorously defended. Senior Counsel was brought down to cross examine
the people who said that they had not had the treatment that he had billed them
for in bulk billing, and, as you can imagine, with a lapse of 12 months or more
it was very difficult for some of these persons to remember the length of time
that the treatment took. Indeed this became very obvious during the proceedings,
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and after three days of hearing in which the patients were cross examined from
their cards as to what diseases they were suffering from, social or otherwise and
why they were seeing the doctor, a deal was made in which he agreed to plead
guilty to 16 charges of fraud in charging for after hours home visits which had
never occurred and which, in several of these cases, the patients stuck by their
guns and said they had not had them. So having pleaded guilty to that he was
dealtwith summarily. As you know under s. 129 he was liable to a $10,000 fine
and five years gaol, as he was dealt with summarily he was fined a relatively small
amount on each of the 16 charges. He had been convicted of about 50% of the
charges that were brought against him, and convicted, as much as anything,
because everybody was finding the whole matter a bit tiresome. I doubt whether
the public’s interest is served if the Department could have prosecuted him for
100 charges. I really think that, without changing the method of proof or
suggesting proof by computer there is a very good case to be made for saying
that the Commonwealth should provide the courts, facilities and the support
systems necessary to police this very expensive system.‘
The second aspect of the matter is when that person comes before a medical
tribunal he is there as a person who has committed l6 offences only and it would
be improper for the Tribunal to deal with him on any other basis. If, of course,
it could have been shown that he had been convicted of 50 or 100 such offences
it may well be that he would be differently treated in respect of what happened
to his practice, and it is in that matter I suggest the community has a very real
interest. Bearing those two interests in mind—the proper punishment of those
who have perpetrated frauds against the community and “rooting out the rogues
from the profession” I would suggest it is time for those who have the power
. and authority to re-examine the manner in which these prosecutions should be
attempted.
R.J. Findlay
I am sure there are people from the Department at this Seminar who draw
great comfort from what has just been said. The limitation of the number of
instances prosecuted to about 50 is not a firm policy, but 50 has been shown to
be the maximum number that can be reasonably handled with our resources,
bearing in mind also that as time passes memories of possible witnesses fade.
Generally the investigation is undertaken not by the Department but by the Federal
Police and, of course, they also have problems with resources, I am sure that
there would be no disagreement between the Commonwealth and yourself on this
matter. If we had the resources the Department would wish to act in accordance
with your precepts, but in practical terms there are immense problems in pursuing
possibly 500 cases.
Dr K.M. Doust, Chairman, Capital Territory Health Commission
A criminal intent can be quite obvious at times, at other times it may be
much more difficult to recognise. The persons themselves may fail, even with
reasonable argument, to accept that they are involvedin an activity where there
could be said to be criminal intent.
As far as Medibank is concerned, of course, it was a change in our whole
system—universal health insurance system came in where a third party took over
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universal payment for health care. This particular event changed the mentality
of the entire medical profession, not the members of the public. I am quite sure
that in the days before Medibank that some doctors’ receptionists knocked off
a few receipts and filled in a few claim forms and collected a bit of money. I
am quite sure that patients obtained them also, and I am quite sure that, at times
doctors slightly modified the itemisation which was then current. I am sure nobody
really changed, but when Medibank came in a system of investigation was
developed for the first time. Before that time no doctor had been convicted of
any offences with regard to health insurance matters, subsequently there have
been. A large number of doctors’ receptionists were investigated and were
convicted, and it is not surprising, of course, that the doctors’ receptionists were
dealt with much more summarily and much more quickly than the doctors
subsequently were, as were members of the public who were found with fraud.
People were physically held in claim offices until the police came, so the whole
aspect of an “investigation system” was developed.
As this investigation system developed more and more publicity occurred,
publicity such as Dr Arnold’s “How to rip off Medibank”. All of this tends to
contribute to the general knowledge of what goes on, and certainly there have
been some deliberate professional attempts to rip off the health funds. I am quite
sure that a number of doctors have seen some of the activities that have occurred,
and have deliberately avoided practices in which they may previously have been
involved so there has been a prophylactic benefit, but, on the other hand where
one evil person somewhere has done quite well you might say “I can get away
with that”. '
To a certain extent the change in the publicity in the activities of the
profession has modified the relationship of patients to doctors, and whether it
is good or bad, I am sure that the changes all indicate that the community wants
some form of protection for the costs that they incur in medical services. They
want a generally community rated service where the sick person is helped by the
person who is reasonably healthy, where the poor person is helped by the person
who can afford to pay the taxes. The G.P.S., of course, have maintained a singular
point of view, that you divorce yourself from government, you get the patient
to pay, but they have been hitting their head against a brick wall ever since they
started. The patient is still in a third party payment system, and it is naive to
accept the view that because the patient only gets benefits on the basis of a receipt,
manipulation cannot occur. For instance,.I am well aware of one patient who
got receipts from the doctor for services that he had not obtained in order that
he could get a refund from the fund in order to pay his medical benefits so he
. could get the money to pay the doctor! The issuing of a receipt and the fact that
you insist on only itemising receipts does not protect against fraud either by the
doctor or the patient.
The community wants some form of system whereby they are given some
support in their health costs, i.e. a third party payment system, and consequently
the people who are involved in insuring the third party payment system give to
the members of the community the best value for their dollar. There is a reasonable
right that these people should have some degree of protection, and this is in part
by the judicial processes and the investigative process.
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Dr P.A. Tomlinson, President, N.S.W. Medical Board
Later on this year I will be attending my 45th graduation dinner, so I can
look buck on medical pruclicc over quilc u long period.
I would like to make a few comments on the written papers. I found that
of the four written papers, two were straight down the centre, and two were .very
doctrinaire—one way out to the left and the other an almost similar distance to
the right. i
In respect to Professor Opit’s paper I would like to state that a large
proportion of what I- read is not in accordance with the facts as I have seen them
over the last 45 years. ‘I take issue on several aspects with him. The statement
(p. 44); .
The medical profession, through its various professional bodies, has refused
to even acknowledge the possibility that some doctors act in a criminal way
within our health care system. ‘
That is about as far from being a fact as anything that has been written or said
at this seminar. It is entirely untrue. There would be at least 90 to 95% of the
medical profession who would be glad to see the criminal element in the profession
removed from the profession. '
In respect of Dr Van Dugteren’s paper he mentions that fraud is mainly
covered by s. 129 of the Act. This, of course, is factual in respect of the
Commonwealth legislation but it might be of benefit to the meeting to know that
under the Medical Practitioners Act (N. S. W.) which has recently been passed an
infringement of s. 129 of the Health Commission Act becomes under the Medical
Practitioners Act (N. S. W.) a defined portion of misconduct in a professional
respect. This means that the time in which a problem can be dealt with has been
expedited.
The problems that I see in respect of crime and doctors are, first of all,
problems in delay in matters being heard. This is a matter in which I have
endeavoured to be active. The Supreme Court has fortunately recently laid'down
a mechanism whereby any appeal from the disciplinary tribunalto the Supreme
Court is now heard in a very much shorter time than previously. One tribunal
matter that went to the Supreme Court on appeal before this new mechanism
was laid down, and that doctor was permitted to practise for two years before
his case was heard, and during that time, of course, he amassed a considerable
amount of his legal fees.
There is a problem, also, in the time that is taken for the matters that are
heard in the Courts of Petty Sessions. These may wait for some time, and’recently
an approach has been made to the Under Secretary for Justice in order that such
matters can be dealt with a little more expeditiously by the courts. There is a
possibility that they may be heard in one or two courts in the State rather than
. a variety of courts.
Another cause of delay is the time taken to produce the availability of the
transcripts of evidence. This is a logistic problem for courts, and this delay impedes '
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. the administration of matters that come‘before the New South Wales Medical
Board and the Disciplinary Tribunal. It has not been made easier by taping, as
they still have to appear in written form, because matters before a Tribunal after
going to the Investigating Committee are in the way of a re-hearing, as are matters
on appeal from a Tribunal to the Supreme Court.
Another matter under the new Act which is awaiting promulgation is that
there shall be an appeal from the Investigating Committee by the complainant.
as well as by the defendant, to a Disciplinary Tribunal, and there shall also be
an appeal by the complainant on matters of law or of the severity of the penalty
from a~Tribunal to the Supreme Court.
In Dr Van Dugteren’s paper I would draw attention to the problems of
medical practice that are being revealed on a day-to-day basis by the practice of
medicine by companies, businesses, foundations and persons who are not legally
qualified as medical practitioners because it is not widely known that all such
people may practise medicine in this State although they are not able to treat all
diseases. I fully endorse the necessity for the teaching of medical jurisprudence
and medical'ethics at undergraduate level.
In Dr Mackey’s paper I agree with the suggestion regarding bulk billing.
Where doctors abuse it I believe they should have that facility withdrawn from
them in respect of their practice. .I will not comment any further on Professor
Opit’s paper, but on matters where I think he is in error and has misinformed
the seminar I would be very pleased to discuss it with him in private on any
occasion.
Dr D.P. Mackey
I was somewhat amazed at Dr Dousts’ comments (pp. 65-66) supporting
third party payment when, as Medical Director of Medibank', he saw the abuses
that went on through bulk billing processes. I think that if we are going to root
out the rogues from the profession we need to root out the cause of the roguery.
Who pays the doctor is very, very important. When a third party pays for the
service, it can be over utilized by the doctor and the patient alike, and the majority
of offences, as we have heard, occur in the bulk billing process. The patient, as
Dr Menon put it, is always the best policeman of services. In my‘ opinion, any,
doctor who bulk bills the government should be regarded as a potential criminal.
It would be a good idea if the government looked at this. They are trying to cut
costs. Let the people who want to bulk bill, bulk bill, but follow Canada’s lead.
restrict it to say $10,000 per practitioner per annum and leave it at that. That
_does not stop the doctor’s from seeing the patients, they can do so and not charge
them. '
' P. Dougdale, Medical student.
I would like to ask what the effects of the recently introduced changes to
health financing arrangements will be on the incidence of crime amongst the
‘ professions?
 Dr 0. Douglas, Medical Practitioner.
l spend a considerable amount of my time sitting on one of these Committees
of Inquiry. I do not do it for fun—it is a lousy job. The pay is crook, the hours
are worse and the coffee is usually cold by the time we drink it. I do it because,
like a lot of my colleagues, I am perturbed at seeing members of my own profession
doing things that I think are not right for a person in their position to be doing.
We spend a lot of time in Committees of Inquiry in investigating allegations of
overservicing against practitioners. The bureaucrats in the Department of Health,
for all their expertise and for all the computers, sometimes miss out badly on
deciding whether a doctor is, in fact, doing the right thing in his practice and
in his charging of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, it is perhaps good to see
that a group of professional colleagues looking at the way a man practises, listening
to him give evidence about his practice can very rapidly form an opinion as to
whether the services that man has been giving have been done properly or
improperly. A Committee of Inquiry can form an opinion as a committee of peers
in a relatively short period of time. The problem with the Committees of Inquiry
is the very cumbersome legal process under which they have to work. The only
reason for having medical practitioners doing this work is because they are the
only people who can recognise what is normal for people of their profession to
be doing, but you negate that when you make a cumbersome legal process in order
to pick these people out.
There is a further problem that has come out of Committees of Inquiry.
This impotence which our committees have had forced upon them is not unknown
to those members of our profession who are willing to overservice their patients
and to get money from the Commonwealth government on their behalf. I believe
that the way in which our committee system is running at present may well be
doing a detriment both to my profession and to the people who are paying these
bills as the Commonwealth Department of Health. I came to this seminar in order
to learn what people who knew more about this interface between two professions
might be able to suggest to make my profession work better and to be seen to
work better. I am afraid the main thing I have learnt tonight is to lock up my
account forms and my receipt forms, as well as the petty cash and the prescription
forms.
Dr Van Dugteren
Brieﬂy, His Honour was quite correct—we did move well away from the
subject of crime. We looked into many areas which probably had nothing to do
with the original intent.
In the eyes of the community health insurance is an entirely different animal
to any other form of insurance. If you use your car insurance, if you use your
householder’s policy, or other similar policy you are a bit cranky. But if you do
not get your money out of health insurance you are being robbed, and I think
the average member of the community looks a lot more critically at what they
get out of their health insurance than what they get out of any other type of
insurance. The Association knows that in the Medical Practitioners Act there is
a serious gap. The New South Wales Medical Board can look at professional
behaviour and a number of other matters but they cannot look at the manner
in which a doctor has supplied a service. We have been approaching the current
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State government now fOr about two years to ensure that there could be a system
of complaint without having to go to common law. Unfortunately at the moment
that is unacceptable to this government.
Dr D.P. Mackey
The last speaker asked what changes would occur in the incidence of
white collar crime with the changes to the National Health Scheme. 1 think the
incidence of white collar crime will decrease significantly, because the changes
to the scheme are going to prevent any doctor classifying any person he likes as
socially disadvantaged. Therefore it is going to cut down the amount of bulk billing
in this particular area. As we have mentioned before it is my opinion, and the
opinion of a number of other doctors, that the great incidence of crime occurs
in this bulk billing area and I‘think it should be policed.
Professor Opit mentioned “the community’s preservation of freedom may
require the doctor to give up some of his”. I do not understand that, because
in a truly free society people cooperate in a voluntary exchange with other people
in the society. The basis of freedom is a lack of coercion—nobody should want
to take away anybody else’s freedom. I do not think Professor Opit should want
to do that to the medical profession or to patients or to anybody else.
R.J. Findlay
I refer to Dr Stein’s comments (pp. 52—53) in case there has been some
misunderstanding. The suggestion that in a changing system it may be possible
for the courts in considering reparation to take note of generalized evidence about
a practice was merely the ﬂoating of an idea. I hope you appreciate that. We
would have welcomed that idea, or some alternative solution to our problem of
securing commensurate penalties, being picked up in discussion. Likewise we were
aware, of course, of the adverse consequences for patients that would flow from
the disqualification of their doctor from issuing accounts that would attract
medical benefits and the cautionary note in the Department’s paper was included
to indicate that we were aware of it.
One matter that I understood was to be raised is the relationship between
the Commonwealth and the funds. It can be expected that in the future there
will be greater cooperation between the Commonwealth and the funds in the
pursuit of fraud and overservicing, and what can be done in this regard is presently
being discussed between the Department of Health and the Commonwealth
Attorney-General’s Department. The impetus for this increased cooperation of
course is that the medical benefits provided since 1 September will attract a mixture
of Commonwealth and fund monies.
The recent developments of the integration of statistical information from
the claims handled by the funds with the bulk billed claims handled by the
Department will also simplify the identification of practitioners who are engaged
in fraud or the provision of excess services. I understand that before too long
there will be some discussion on the most effective form of joint action between
the Department and the funds, probably in the context of the Health Insurance
Advisory Council.
 7]
Professor Opit
I would like to answer Mr Purvis’ question because I consider it is very
important. Has there been an increase in medical fraud or medical crime, and
if so, why? Of course, nobody knows for certain. I can certainly state it has been
happening in my experience and in my environment since 1962, so it is certainly
not new. I would suspect that it has increased partly because the number of doctors
has increased, partly because the total number of services have increased, and
partly because I think there has been a loss of moral consensus in our society. -
I think an analogy would be tax-avoidance. We have abandoned rather old
fashioned notions of consensus. In Australia and many other western societies
consensus is based on the consensus of acquisition. It is now smart to get rich,
and so I suspect that this problem has increased and will go on increasing in the
short term. We cannot deny the existence of what is going on. I am very
disappointed in this seminar because I had hoped to hear some comment from
lawyers about, for example, whether or not it is possible to look at the law itself
to see what changes could be made vis-a-vis defining agency relationships between
the practitioner and the funding agent. 15 there some way in which that relationship
could be defined which would make protection and prosecution of defined fraud,
at least, easier? I am very sorry, in fact, that this has not happened.
Chairman
We have to try and do the best that we can in our society to suppress criminal
activities in the white collar area—in the provision of medical services equally
with the other specie of white collar crime. But it is the moral fibre of the com-
munity which ultimately will dictate the extent to which we are free of crime,
whether it is white collar crime or any other sort of crime. I agree with Dr Douglas
that there is great benefit to be had from the mutual strengthening of recognition
of professional obligation. We might with advantage conclude this seminar on
a note of idealism—a note of emphasising the mantle of integrity that the
community puts upon the medical profession and the obligation of the medical
profession itself to see that that mantle is worn proudly and without tarnish. To
a large extent I believe that the internal peer pressure amongst the members of
a profession, as with any other group, is perhaps the most potent weapon for
preserving integrity and proper standards. If adjustments in billing, to use a
euphemism, are tolerated and laughed about at the golf club then they will become
widespread. If those who do it are looked upon askance by their fellow practi-
tioners, they soon become known and identifiable by the authorities and their
opportunities become diminished. If we within our society demand integrity from
those of whom we expect it, then I believe we will receive it.
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